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1115
THE CLASSIFICATION AND REGULATION OF

VARIABLE ANNUITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial segment of the life insurance industry has proposed that a new type of annuity contract be issued which is designed to protect retirement plans from inflation. This contract is
called a variable annuity. Instead of the customary fixed sum annuity payments, such contracts provide for dollar benefits which
vary in accordance with the current value of a portfolio of common
stocks in which the annuity considerations have been invested. The
proposal has created a controversy involving some life insurance
companies, investment companies, and the corresponding regulatory
agencies at both state and federal levels.
A. THE VARIABLE ANNUITY: A DEsCRIPTION
A retired person without sufficient capital to live on interest
alone has to expend capital to meet ordinary living expenses. Such
an individual may apportion his capital by calculations based upon
average life expectancy. However, he runs the risk of prematurely
exhausting his financial resources if he outlives the average life expectancy.- This risk can be avoided by purchasing a life annuity,
that is, a contract by which an insurance company 2 agrees to make
periodic payments to the purchaser for the duration of his life.3 The
company then distributes the risk among the entire group purchasing annuities.
Traditionally, payments on such annuity contracts have been
guaranteed payments of a fixed sum. 4 However, there have been
some examples of annuities involving variable benefits,5 and pay1. Of 100 male annuitants living at age 65, although the expectancy is
15 years, at age 80 there will be 48 still alive, and at age 85 there will be
29 still living. Transcript of Public Hearing on Assesmbly Bills Nos. 450, 451,
452 (Re Variable Annuities), New Jersey Senate Business Affairs Committee, June 22, 1956, p. 4. These figures represent a more favorable indication
of life expectancy than the average, however, since the annuity purchaser is
usually in better health than the average non-annuitant
2. The issuance of annuities is not limited to insurance companies.
Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law 11 (2d ed. 1957). For instance,
annuities, in the popular sense, may be conferred by a will or trust and the
annuity principle is often used by investment companies when no life contingency factor is involved. However, annuity policies normally are issued
by insurance companies.
3. See 1956 Life Insurance Fact Book 104, 106. Many variations are
possible. An annuity may be purchased for a term of years, for txvo joint
lives, for ten years or life whichever is longer, etc. See Maclean, Life Insurance 48-55 (8th ed. 1957).
4. See Mehr and Osler, Modem Life Insurance 84 (rev. ed. 1956).
5. See In re Supreme or Cosmopolitan Council of Brotherhood of
Commonwealth, 193 Misc. 996, 86 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct 1949); Day,
A Variable Ann.ity Is an Annuity, 1955 Ins. L.J. 75, 781-82.
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ments on conventional annuity contracts do vary to the extent that
the purchaser may participate in the surplus of the company. The
variable annuity to be discussed in this Note applies the annuity
principle (systematic distribution of capital and income) to a common stock fund created by the purchasers of these annuities.,
Although the amount of the periodic payments to be derived
from conventional annuities can be determined at the time a policy
is issued, in determining variable annuity benefits several separate
calculations must be made subsequent to the issuance of the contract. The first type of calculation takes place during the accumulation period, that is, the period of time during which the variable
6. See Johnson, The Variable Annuity: What It is and Why It is
Needed, 1956 Ins. L.J. 357, 362-63. Most annuity contracts, however, are nonparticipating. See Maclean, Life Insurance 55 (8th ed. 1957).
7. For a general description of the variable annuity, see Johnson,
supra note 6, at 362.
8. In several places the text refers to the variable annuity portfolio as
being a common stock "fund." It is used in this Note as a generally descriptive term, not as a term of art.
The variable annuity principle is already being used in many group
retirement plans. In such plans, the variable annuity is usually balanced
against a fixed program, such as a group annuity; but the payments on the
variable plan depend entirely upon the group experience with expense, investment, and mortality. These plans are either self-administered by the
employer, or by a trustee, such as a bank, and are not subject to insurance
or securities regulation. See Schechter, Variable Annuitlies-Boon or Bane?,
1956 Ins. L.J. 764, 768. For texts of such plans, see CCH Pension and Profit
Sharing Plans and Clauses 11130,411, 30,421 (1957).
A variable annuity plan is available for certain teachers through the
College Retirement Equities Fund. For a detailed description of the CREF
variable annuity see Lloyd, CREF and TIAA Variable Annuity in Action,
95 Trusts & Estates 244 (1956) ; Johnson, A Safe Retirement Income?, 94
Trusts & Estates 12 (1955). The plan by Jan. 1, 1957 had 31,156 participants
with variable annuity assets of $39,817,951; its annuity unit began with a
value of $10.00 in July 1952 and had a stated value of $18.51 as of Jan. 1,
1957. Trial Brief for Defendants, p. 28, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 155 F. Supp. 521 (D.C. 1957).
The variable annuity principle has been incorporated into the Wisconsin public employees retirement program, Wis. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 381, § 3,
and into the Wisconsin teachers' retirement program. Wis. Sess. Laws 1957,
c. 322, § 2, and c. 423, § 2.
There are 3 operating variable annuity companies: Participating Annuity Life Insurance Company of Rogers, Arkansas; Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Company, Washington, D.C.; Equity Annuity Life Insurance
Company, Washington, D.C. Morrissey, Dispute Over the Variable Annuity, Jan.-Feb. 1957 Harv. Bus. Rev. 75, 77. The Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Company is licensed to do business in the District of Columbia,
Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia. Trial Brief for Defendants, pp.
4-7, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C.
1957). The VALIC individual policy provides for optional term insurance,
waiver of premiums for disability, and many other typical insurance policy
provisions. There is also a penalty provision for withdrawal during the first
5 years. VALIC assumes the risk of adverse mortality and expense experience. The policy is reproduced in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
supraat 529-38.

NOTES

1117

annuity is being purchased by payment to the company of a fixed
number of dollars each month or year.9 The purchaser is credited for
each payment with a number of "accumulation units" which is determined by the net consideration divided by the value of a "unit"
at the time of payment. The value of a "unit" depends on the value
of the common stock fund at that time.
Later, at the time of retirement, the aggregate number of "accumulation units" is mathematically converted into the number of
. 0
to be paid annually to the variable annuitant. This calculation
units
involves the same factors as converting premium payments in dollars on a conventional annuity contract into dollar benefits to be
returned by installments. The principal factor in this calculation is
the mortality table.
After the number of units to be paid out annually is fixed, the
value of each unit must be determined. Once again, this value will
depend upon the value of the common stock fund which supports the
variable annuities. Calculation of this value will be made at the time
of each payment."1
B. ECONOmiC BASIS

The basic need for the variable annuity arises from the decrease
2
in monetary purchasing power due to inflation.' Most economists
predict that this inflation will continue because of inflationary forces

9. The payment of a fixed sum periodically is the utilization of the
dollar averaging method of investment which specifies that the purchaser
must buy the same dollar amount of a security no matter how high or low the
market value. Since the long term trend is up, the purchaser will gain in the
long run and will avoid the risk of guessing about when to buy or sell. See
Johnson, Immediate Variable Life Annuities, 95 Trusts & Estates 96 (1956).
Variable annuities could also be purchased in a lump sum. In that event,
the calculation of "annuity units" would be accomplished immediately. For
explanation of the term "annuity units" see text related to note 10 infra.
10. Called "annuity units."
11. The value of a unit is multiplied by the number of units to be
paid in order to determine the dollar amount of the payment.
Several variations of the variable annuity as described may be possible.
For instance, the contract might provide for conversion to a conventional
annuity at the end of the accumulation period in order to provide for guaranteed benefits. Then the amount of dollar benefits would be calculated at
the time of conversion.
12. "The value of the dollar has declined in 44 years, remained constant
in 11 years and risen slightly in 19 years of the past 75. At the end of the
75-year period the dollar had a value one third of that which it had at the
beginning. Furthermore, it is not possible to find a single 20-year period
within the 75 years during which the average value of the dollar is as low
as it is in the subsequent 20-year period." Statement by Wilford J. Eiteman,
Professor of Finance at the University of Michigan, Hearing, supra note 1,
at 137A.
Also, the prices of annuities have risen due to increased longevity and
the decline in yield on bonds and mortgages. Johnson, supra note 6, at 357.
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now built into our economy. 3 It has also been pointed out that the
general trend of common stock values has been upward in the long
run, although subject to wide variations in the short term." Further,
economists predict that the upward trend in stocks will continue due

to technological improvement and expansion of industry through in15

creased consumption.

If these economic assumptions are correct, the variable annuity
may prove to be a valuable device for providing for retirement income. But whether or not the economic assumptions are correct and
whether or not the life insurance industry should risk goodwill by
selling the variable annuity 16 are questions which go beyond the
scope of this Note. As a matter of legal policy, the objections of all
opponents 17 can be met by adequate regulation, including the assurance that an individual knows what he is buying.
13. See Kvernland, Some Economic and Investment Aspects of Variable
Annuities, 1956 Ins. L.J. 373-74; Morrissey, supra note 8, at 77, 84.
But insurance industry opponents to the variable annuity question the
economic assumptions upon which it is based. They say that we have had
little inflation other than during and after wars, that this feeling of continued inflation is just a recurrence of the "New Era" disease of the '20's,
and that when the market goes down the industry goodwill will suffer. See
National Underwriter, Dec. 30, 1955, p. 2; Hearing, supra note 1, at 16A.
These opponents also believe that the variable annuity is giving up the fight
against inflation and that it will encourage the idea of inflation popularly.
See Long, The Variable Annuity: A Common Stock Investment Scheme,
1956 Ins. L.J. 393, 395; Hearing, supra note 1, at 108A.
14. See Sedgwick, A New Pension Plan, Jan.-Feb. 1953 Harv. Bus.
Rev. 70, 73-74. The average annual increase in stock prices (including dividends) for all industrial common stock on the New York Stock Exchange
was 8.8% per year from 1871 to 1937, and 12% per year from 1938 to 1951.
Ibid.
One writer has said that if variable annuities had been sold in the past
and balanced against a fixed value program to smooth out the highs and
lows, there would have been a remarkably good correlation between the cost
of living and the benefits derived from such a policy. See Johnson, supra
note 9, at 97-98.
15. See The Next Twenty Years, Fortune, Jan. 1958, p. 110; Morrissey,
supra note 8, at 77; Weston, The Stock Market in Perspective, March-April
1956 Harv. Bus. Rev. 71, 72-77. It has also been argued that there is a need
for a greater supply of equity investment in order to support this growth of
American industry. See Kvernland, supra note 13, at 378-80; Schechter,
supranote 8, at 772.
Contra, it is said there is a substantial danger that the market could
crash in the future due to saturation of consumption or decreased defense
spending and that the so-called inflationary elements in the economy would
serve to maintain the cost of living in spite of the decline in stock values.
See National Underwriter, Dec. 30, 1955, pp. 2, 15. It is also argued that the
present sources of investment capital are insufficient and that widespread sale
of variable annuities would only cause inflation of common stock prices. See
Long, supra note 13, at 398; National Underwriter, May 10, 1958, p. 1.
16. Part of the industry is greatly concerned with possible loss of
goodwill. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 126A. Some also fear that the sale of
variable annuities would invite federal reconsideration of the tax status of
insurance companies and would be the opening wedge for federal regulation.
See Pyle, The Case Against VariableAnnuities, 1956 Ins. L.J. 776, 778.
17. Some members of the securities industry say that since the variable
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This Note is directed at the determination of what constitutes
adequate regulation of variable annuities. In solving this problem
an examination and evaluation will be made of present regulatory
systems. Finally, consideration will be given to the various proposals
for regulation of the variable annuity.
II. PRESENT REGULATION
A. THE CONTROVERSY
The securities industry claims that the variable annuity is a
security and should be regulated as a security."" Part of the life
insurance industry claims that the variable annuity is an insurance
contract and therefore should be subject to regulation by the state
insurance commissions and exempt from federal regulation.' 9
This controversy reached the courts in SEC v. VariableAnnuity
Life Ins. Co. 20 In that case the SEC sought an injunction in a fed-

eral district court restraining VALIC from selling variable annuity
contracts. The SEC alleged: (1) that the Variable annuity is a security subject to the Securities Act of 1933; (2) that VALIC is an
investment company subject to the Investment Company Act of
1940; and, (3) that VALIC had not complied with these acts.
VALIC contended that variable annuity contracts are insurance
policies, that a company issuing these policies is an insurance company, and that therefore VALIC is not subject to regulation by the
SEC since insurance business is exempt from the acts.
The trial court stated the issue to be whether "such contracts
[are] insurance policies, or ...securities evidencing investments or
interests in investments."' -1 The opinion which followed is somewhat
confusing. First, the court refused to classify the contract as either
security or insurance since it found that the variable annuity does
not fit either category exactly and because such a choice rests on
"broad principles of public policy" within the province of the legislature.22 Then, the court said that since VALIC was licensed and
regulated by the insurance departments of the states in which it opannuity is a security it should not be sold by insurance companies no matter
how well regulated. Perhaps fear of competition underlies this position. See
Morrissey, The Variable Annuity 12 (1955). However, most of the industry
say that all they want is equal regulation and tmation. See Haussermann,
The Security in Variable Annuities, 1956 Ins. L.J. 382-83; Long, rupra note
13, at 397-98.
18. Haussermann, su ra note 17.
19. Day, pra note 5.
20. 155 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1957).
21. Id. at 523.
22. Id. at 528.
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erates, it is exempt from SEC regulation by "the broad, explicit and
impelling language of the McCarran Act" which exempts "the
business of insurance" from most federal regulation. 23 Thus, the
court, although it disclaimed making the choice, in effect found that
the variable annuity is insurance.
The court of appeals affirmed, adding little to enlightened analycourt to the
sis and giving even greater weight than the district
24
determination of the insurance commissioners.
Such an approach seems highly unsatisfactory. First, in deciding a controversy based upon federal statutes a court is bound to
carry out federal policy. While the fact that this contract was considered to be insurance by a state administrative agency may be
some evidence of its nature, the state determination should not be
controlling. 25 Secondly, both opinions lack any real analysis of the
problems involved. Such an analysis appears essential.
The SecuritiesAct of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 defines a security to be:
[A] ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in an), profitsharing agreement,... investment contract, ..

. or, in general,

26
any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.'
This definition has been liberally construed, 27 and as so applied, the
"investment contract" provision might well include annuities and

155 F. Supp. at 527. Section 2 of the McCarran Act provides:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the
regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance. 59 Stat. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1952).
24. 26 U.S.L. Week 2591 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 1958). The court stated:
"The definitions in the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act
indicate that if the insurance commissioner of a state subjects the business to
his supervision, it is the business of insurance." Ibid.
25. Cf. Soc'y for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143, 151 (1955); Sola
Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). Although the
court in the VALIC case based its result on the broad provisions of the
McCarran Act, it still could not avoid determining whether VALIC was
doing an insurance business. The court apparently felt that the policy of the
McCarran Act was to leave that determination to the states. However, it is
doubtful that such a result was intended when there is a square conflict with
a federal regulatory scheme.
26. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1952). (Emphasis added.)
27. See United States v. Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421, 426 (D. Del. 1942);
SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264, 266-67 (E.D. Wash. 1940).
23.
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the variable annuity.2 8 However, the act exempts from its provisions:
Any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract, issued by a corporation subject to the
supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank commissioner,
or any agency or officer performing like finctions, of any State
or Territory of the United States or the ]District of Columbia.29

The question then presented is whether the variable annuity may
properly be characterized as an annuity within the meaning of this
exemption.30
The most important similarity between the variable annuity and
the conventional annuity is that both involve the systematic distribution of capital and income. Another similarity is that both the
conventional life annuity and the variable life annuity distribute the
risk of time of death among a group, and shift the risk of group
mortality to the company.
An apparent difference between the conventional and the variable annuity is that the latter provides for variable benefits. In the
past most courts have said that an annuity involves the periodic payment of a fixed sum.31 However, state statutes defining annuities do
not compel such a result, 82 it is not necessarily true historically,3
the inclusion of the word fixed is usually dictum and probably unconsidered, 8 4 and there is case law contra.3 5
28. See Note, Variable Annuity: Security or Annuity?, 43 Va. L. Rev.
699, 703-06 (1957).
29. 48 Stat. 76 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1952).
(Emphasis added.)
30. In examining the definition of a security and the annuity exemption
together, some writers attempting classification of the variable annuity have
aparently adopted the approach that the variable annuity is either an annuity or a security. E.g., Day, supra note 5. Such an approach is misleading,
however, since it implicitly rejects the possibility that an annuity itself may
be a security. An argument will be presented in this Note that some types
of annuities are a form of security and that other types of annuities are a
form of insurance. See text at notes 48-53 infra. Consequently, the proper
consideration under the Securities Act of 1933 is whether the variable annuity
is an annuity, not whether it is security or annuity.
31. See Mehr and Osler, op. cit. supra note 4, at 84; Haussermann,
spra note 17, at 388-89. From this it has been argued that the variable annuity is not an annuity.
32. See, e.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 46(2):
"Annuities," meaning all agreements to make periodical payments where
the making or continuance of all or some of a series of such payments,
or the amount of any such payment, is dependent upon the continuance
of human life.
33. See Day, supra note 5, at 781-82.
34. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Probate Court, 186 Minn. 351,
356, 243 N.W. 389, 391 (1932). Further, the cases in which a finding of fixed
benefits was necessary for the result have usually involved tax statutes or
interpretation of wills. See, e.q., Bacon v. Comm'r of Corp. and Tax, 266
Mass. 547, 165 N.E. 664 (1929). It seems clear that since those cases do not
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Thus, it appears that the variable annuity may properly be
characterized as an annuity. If, however, a court finds that the variable annuity is not an annuity, the contract should be classified as a
security since it would not be desirable to have an unregulated noman's-land between security and annuity.
The Investment Company Act of 1940
Assuming that the variable annuity is a security, it becomes relevant to consider whether a company selling such policies is subject
to regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940.38 This act
defines an investment company to be a company which:
[I] s engaged ...in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to
acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per
centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of
securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated
Government
37
basis.

An insurance company, although it might well be an investment
company under this definition, is specifically exempted, 8 and is defined as:
[A] company which is organized as an insurance company,
whose primary and predominantbusiness activity is the writing
of insurance or the reinsuring of risks underwritten by insurance
companies, and which is subject to supervision by the insurance
commissioner or a similar official or agency of a State. 9
Consequently, it appears that whether or not VALIC is exempt
from the act as an insurance company will depend on whether the
writing of annuity contracts is "the writing of insurance," that is,
whether the annuity is insurance. 40
consider classification for the purpose of regulation, they are not good law
for that purpose.
35. See, e.g., In re Supreme or Cosmopolitan Council of Brotherhood of
Commonwealth, 193 Misc. 996, 86 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct 1949); Day, A
Variable Annuity Is Not A "Security," 32 Notre Dame Law. 642, 658-61
(1957).
36. 54 Stat 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1--80a-52 (1952).
37. Id. at 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (a) (3).
38. Id. at 798, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (3).
39. Id. at 793, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (17). (Emphasis added.)
40. Although many state statutes define a company issuing annuities
to be an insurance company, see, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 61.01 (1953), most courts
have held that annuities are not insurance. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Penn Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 196 Miss. 345, 17 So. 2d 278 (1944) ; Couch, Cyclopedia of
Insurance Law § 25 (1929). But these cases have usually involved interpretations of local statutes, or tax problems, or both. See, e.g., Corporation
Comm'n v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 73 Ariz. 171, 239 P.2d 360 (1951);
State ex rel. Thornton v. Probate Court, 186 Minn. 351, 243 N.W. 389 (1932).
Such cases do not consider classification for the purpose of determining the
scope of federal regulatory statutes and consequently are not good law for
that purpose.
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The definition of a security under the Investment Company Act
is the same as under the Securities Act of 1933.1 It has been pointed
out that this definition under the latter act may be broad enough to
include annuities as securities. 4 2 It is also significant to note the
manner in which insurance and annuities are specifically exempted
from that act:
Sec. 3. (a) Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any of the following
classes of securities:
4
(8) Any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract.
Although this implies that insurance and annuities are securities,"
it has been pointed out that the above provision was actually the
product of overcaution.4 5 The House Report states that section
3(a) (8) :
[M] akes clear what is already implied in the act, namely, that
insurance policies are not to be regarded as securities subject to
the provisions of the act.... The entire tenor of the act would
lead, even without this specific exemption, to the exclusion of
insurance policies from the provisions of the act, but the specific
exemption is included to make misinterpretation impossible.4 6
However, this language, while it clearly indicates that insuranceis
not a security, leaves some doubt as to whether annuitiesare securities since the language quoted applies to the House version of the
bill which contained no exemption for annuities. 47
Since the act does not provide a clear answer, it is necessary to
examine the nature of an annuity in order to determine whether it is
insurance or security. In doing so, it will be useful to consider separately the annuity for a term of years and the life annuity.
The similarities between the life annuity and insurance may best
be seen by comparing the life annuity and life insurance, which concededly is insurance. First, both involve the basic insurance principle of distributing the risk of an occurrence, other than adverse investment experience, among a large group of persons. 48 Through life
41. Compare 48 Stat 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1952)

(definition of "security" under Securities Act of 1933), with 54 Stat. 795
(1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (35) (1952) (definition of "security" under
Investment Company Act of 1940).
42. See note 28 supra and related text.

43. 48 Stat. 76 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1952).
44. See Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43
Yale L.J. 171, 182-83 (1933).
(Emphasis added.)

45. Loss, Securities Regulation 322 (1951).
46. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933).
47. See 77 Cong. Rec. 3901 (1933). The annuity exemption was later
added by the conference committee.
48. See Mehr and Osler, op. cit. supra note 4, at 22.
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insurance a company distributes the policyholder's risk that he may
die earlier than the predicted average; through the annuity a company distributes the policyholder's risk that he may outlive the predicted average. Secondly, both contracts normally shift the risk of
group mortality to the insurer. In the case of life insurance, the
company assumes the risk that the group as a whole may die earlier
than the predicted average life expectancy. In the case af annuities,
the company assumes the risk that the group as a whole may live
longer than the predicted average life expectancy. This risk of group
mortality is a substantial risk, at least on annuity policies, since average life expectancy is constantly increasing.
In summary, it would appear that the life annuity is a species of
the genus insurance, if not the same species as life insurance. 40 It
follows that a company primarily" engaged in the sale of life annuities and variable life annuities is an insurance company and consequently not subject to the provisions of the Investment Company
Act of 1940.51
Turing to a consideration of the annuity for a term of years, it
appears that such a contract is basically unlike insurance. The only
risk distribution function that the annuity for a term of years pro82
vides is distribution of the risk of adverse investment experience.
Since this is the basic function of investment companies, it can
hardly be a valid basis for classification as insurance. In addition, an
annuity for a term of years seems indistinguishable from a form of
security called the "face amount certificate," which is defined as:
49. Some courts make the distinction that an annuity is not insurance
since benefits are contingent upon living, not death. See, e.g., Corporation
Comm'n v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 73 Ariz. 171, 175, 239 P.2d 360, 362
(1951). However, such a distinction wholly disregards the risk distributing
nature of insurance. Also, some courts mistakenly assume that if annuities
are not life insurance they are not insurance. See, e.g., Matter of Southern,

257 App. Div. 574, 577, 14 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3-4 (3d Dep't 1939).

50. Determination of the criteria for defining."primarily" might raise
some practical problems since many annuities are a mixed life annuity and
annuity for a term of years (annuity for life or 10 years whichever is
longer). However, as long as the calculation involves a contingency based
upon life, it should be considered to be insurance since it still involves risk
distributing and risk shifting and since the insurance commissioners are
better equipped to regulate contracts involving life contingencies than
security regulatory agencies.
51. However, if a state found the variable annuity to be a security and
not insurance, and thereby declined jurisdiction over it as insurance, then a
company primarily engaged in selling such policies could not meet the
statutory exemption. See text at note 39. In that event the SEC could clearly
assume jurisdiction.
52. While an insurance company may not only distribute the individual's
investment risk but also assume the group risk, such a risk may be assumed
by an investment company on some securities. E.g., bonds and face amount
certificates with guaranteed return.
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[A] ny certificate, investment contract, or other security which
represents an obligation on the part of its issuer to pay a stated
or determinable sum or sums at a fixed or determinable date or
dates more than twenty-four months after the date of issuance, in
consideration of the payment of periodic installments."
Thus it would seem that an annuity or variable annuity for a
term of years is a security and, therefore, a company primarily engaged in the sale of such policies should be classified as an investment company.
The McCarranAct
The McCarran Act's broad exemption of "the business of insurance" from federal regulation adds little or nothing to the resolution
of the problems treated above. Interpretation of that act will depend
upon precisely the same consideration, already fully discussed:
whether the business activity may properly be characterized as the
insurance business.

B.

EVALUATION OF EXISTING INSURANCE AND

SECURITIES REGULATION
Although the arguments made above that a variable annuity is
an annuity and that the variable life annuity is insurance appear persuasive, the opposing arguments are not entirely without merit.
Basically those arguments are, that the variable annuity is not an
annuity since it does not involve the traditional guaranteed benefits,
and that the variable annuity company is an investment company
54
because it performs more investment than insurance functions.
It would seem therefore that a more useful approach to the question of classification would be to: (1) determine the probable interests of the variable annuity policyholder ;5sand, (2) determine
which system of existing regulation, insurance or security, may more
adequately protect these interests.
The policyholder's interests
The average individual in purchasing a variable annuity has several rather important interests. These are: (1) that the salesman be
53. 54 Stat. 792 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (15) (1952). (Emphasis
added.)
54. For arguments that the variable annuity is a security, see Bellinger,

Hagmann, and Martin, The Meaning and Usage of the Word "Annuity"
9 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 261 (1955); Haussermann, supra note 17; Long,
supra note 13.
55. The possibility that the interests of the individual policyholder may
collide with the interests of the public as a whole will be discussed infra at
text accompanying note 126.
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capable and that he use fair methods in making the sale; (2) that
the policy itself be fair; and, (3) that the retirement fund be protected to some extent from use for speculative investments.
Existing securities regulation
The theory of federal securities regulation is to compel full disclosure of all material facts so that the investor may make an informed decision on a particular security.5 6 No attempt is made to
pass on the merits of a particular investment, apparently because it
is felt that a free market in securities based upon economic and business forces is more desirable.
Full disclosure is sought by requiring that a registration statement be effective before anyone may use the mails or interstate
commerce to sell a security. 57 This statement contains prescribed
information on the issuing company, its officers, and the proposed
venture. Also, the prospective buyer must be furnished with a
prospectus, which contains much of the information in the registration statement, before the seller may use conventional advertising
material. 58
While these disclosure provisions are effectively enforced and
provide a significant deterrent to the issuance of fraudulent securities, there are loopholes in the system.59 First, once the registration
statement becomes effective there can be oral offers by interstate
telephone.60 The investor, therefore, may be sold mentally, if not
legally, before he ever sees the prospectus. Secondly, once the prospective buyer has the prospectus the seller is free to use whatever
advertising material he sees fit. 6 ' The prospect may be so blinded

from the supplementary sales material accompanying or following
the prospectus or from telephone sales presentations that he will be
unable to make a rational choice on the basis of the prospectus. 62
Further, he either may not read the prospectus, or may not understand it.63 Thirdly, even if it is clear on the face of the prospectus
that the security is a very bad investment, the SEC cannot prevent
its sale.6 4
56. See McCormick, Understanding the Securities Act and the SEC
24, 195-238 (1948).
57. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1952).
58. 48 Stat 75, 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(10) (a), 77e
(1952) ; Loss, Securities Regulation 131-47 (1951).
59. For a critical analysis of the act, see Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 Yale Rev. (n.s.) 521 (1934).
60. Loss, Securities Regulation 148-49 (1951).
61. Id. at 132. Such advertising materials, however, are subject to the
fraud provisions.
62. Douglas, supra note 59, at 523-24, 528.
63. Id. at 523; Loss, Securities Regulation 158-61 (1951).
64. McCormick, Understanding the Securities Act and the SEC 19798, 298-99 (1948) ; Douglas, supra note 59, at 527.
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Another significant weakness in securities regulation is the lack
of effective control over salesmen. There is no provision for federal
licensing of salesmen, and while most states -require registration of
salesmen, only a few states provide for an examination as a prerequisite for selling securities. 65
Finally, securities regulation would provide only insignificant
control over the type of investments made by a company selling
variable annuities. 8 This may be an advantage since a company
which is not restricted to "blue chips" may be able to provide greater
profits for the policyholder. However, since such freedom may lead
to abuses, it would seem preferable to impose some reasonable
standards for investments.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 does provide for some
controls beyond those discussed above. 7 However, it does not provide for controls over the substance of the variable annuity contract
in many essential areas nor does it set substantial investment standards. Further, since it would not apply to insurance companies selling variable annuities, 88 it would affect only a small number of such
policies sold.
State regulation of securities, through the Blue Sky Laws, does
provide for some evaluation of the merits of securities in certain
jurisdictions. 69 However, since the Blue Sky Laws generally contain so many exceptions and exemptions and may possibly be
avoided in a particular state because of archaic and confused choice
of law rules,70 their overall effectiveness seems questionable. Of
some importance is the fact that the Securities Act of 1933 was
passed because of the inadequacy of the Blue Sky Laws. 71 Also, the
Blue Sky Laws do not control policy content nor set investment
standards.
In spite of the limitations noted above, the disclosure type of
regulation is generally effective for the sale of securities since it
65. See Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 279 (1958).
66. See The Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission, August 20, 1957, p. 18: "It is important for investors to understand that the
Commission does not supervise the investment activities of these companies
and that regulation by the Commission does not imply safety of investment in
such companies."

67. For general discussions of the act, see Loss, Securities Regulation

94-102, 269-75 (1951) ; Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26

Wash. U.L.Q. 303 (1941) ; Motley, Jackson, and Barnard, Federal Regulation of Investment Companies since 1940, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1134 (1950).
68. See text at notes 38-40 supra.
69. Loss, Securities Regulation 36-38 (1951).
70. See Loss, Conflict of Laws and the Blue Sky Laws, 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 209 (1957).
71. Loss, Securities Regulation 56-58 (1951); McCormick, Understanding the Securities Act and the SEC 12 (1948).
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forces the truth out into the open where it is likely to affect the price
and marketability of a security in competition for investor funds,
and since it provides remedies for fraud. Further, such regulation
may be well suited for regulating the sale of securities since the nature of a security is generally well understood and since more
stringent regulation would probably unduly restrain honest capital
raising ventures. But the variable annuity will usually be purchased
by unsophisticated persons who do not understand the nature and
complexity of such a product. No amount of disclosure will be adequate to protect such persons. Further, the sale of variable annuities
is not a capital raising venture, but a means of providing retirement
income. Consequently, it is not necessary to balance the interest of
freedom of investment with the interest of protecting the individual.
It would seem, therefore, that a more comprehensive system than
that offered by securities regulation is desirable for protection of the
variable annuity policyholder.
Existing insurance regulation
The theory of insurance regulation in general requires that fair
methods be used in selling a fair policy and that the company be
maintained in such financial condition that it will be able to pay all
claims present and future.
Regulation of salesmen is accomplished through licensing in all
states.7 2 Issuance of the license is generally dependent upon passing
an examination or meeting certain standards of training73 and the
license is subject to revocation for a violation of the insurance code.
In most states, insurance policy forms must be filed with and
approved by the insurance commissions. 74 Approval of such forms
may not be given, or a previously filed form may be suspended, if
the policy does not meet statutory standards or if it is unfair or unjust.7 5 Unfortunately, some states except annuity policies from all 7 8
or part of77 these provisions.

Insurance regulation typically provides for control over business
getting methods through unfair trade practices acts78 and misrepresentation and twisting statutes.7 1 While some states have been lax in
enforcement in this area, the recent FTC effort to enter the regulaPatterson, Essentials of Insurance Law 45 (2d ed. 1957).
Id. at 46.
Id. at 36.
Mehr and Osler, Modem Life Insurance 693 (Rev. ed. 1956).
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 61.38 (1) (1953).
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 951 (f) (1953).
E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 72.20-.35 (Supp. 1957).
79. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 61.10 (1953).
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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tion of insurance advertising 0 has stimulated state legislation to
strengthen this type of regulation and its enforcement.81
In almost all states there are effective quantitative and qualitative standards for the investments which may be made by insurance
companies in common stocks. s2 These standards generally limit the
company to purchase of stock in liquid companies with good earning records. Although perhaps too restrictive in some respects and
not enough in others, these standards clearly do provide a substantial measure of protection to the policyholder.
The Unauthorized Insurers Service of Process Act in effect
in forty-two 8 3 states serves as an effective aid in enforcement of

these insurance laws. As an example, it provides for personal jurisdiction over a company which merely mails advertising or a policy
into a state. 84
Clearly then the variable annuity should be subject to insurancetype regulation since it would provide more adequate protection for
the interests of the variable annuity policyholder than securities
regulation. However, whether or not a particular state is sufficiently
regulating the variable annuity as insurance to meet the standards
of the statutory exemption may be another matter.85 For example,
in some states, the variable annuity may not even be subject to insurance regulation under existing law.88 But if the variable annuity
company is not subject to insurance regulation in a particular state,
80. See National Casualty Co. v. FTC, 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957) ;

cert. granted, 355 U.S. 867 (1957) ; American Hospital and Life Ins. Co.
v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 867 (1957).
81. See 1957 Proc. N.A.I.C., 329-32.
82. See text at notes 126-41 infra.
83. 1957 Proc. N.A.I.C. 330. See, e.g., Calif. 7ns. Code Ann. §§ 1610-20
(West 1956).
84. Calif. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 1610-11 (West 1956). The act was held
constitutional where the only contact with the state was a single policy
sent through the mail. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220

(1957).
85. The prerequisite for exemption is that the contract be issued by a
corporation "subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner....
48 Stat. 76 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (8) (1952). (Emphasis
added.) On its face this exemption does not seem to call for an examination
of the adequacy of a particular state's insurance regulation. However, some
contend that such an examination is required by the act. For a discussion of
this problem in a related area, see Kimball and Boyce, The Adequacy of
State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-FergusonAct in Historical Perspective, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 566-78 (1958).
86. For instance, the Arizona court has held that annuities are not
insurance. Corporation Comm'n v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 73 Ariz. 171,
239 P.2d 360 (1951). Consequently, it could be argued that a variable annuity
company would not be subject to insurance regulation in that state. However,
if such a company, unregulated by the insurance laws in its home state,
attempts to do business in any other state, then the latter state can characterize the nature of the business for itself and may refuse a license to do
business on the ground that the company is not sufficiently regulated to
protect the purchasers of its contracts. Cf. Minn. Stat. § 71.16 (1953) ; State
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then that portion of its business will not be exempted from federal
regulation.s 7 Consequently, such a company need not go wholly unregulated.
In the final analysis, since insurance-type regulation is preferable to securities regulation, the choice to regulate should be in the
states, as it is in other areas of insurance regulation,"" since most
states would adequately regulate the variable annuity as insurance8 9
Such a result is consistent with the apparent congressional intent
of leaving to the states a subject adequately regulated by the states.
Dual regulation, that is, regulation by a state as insurance and by
the SEC as a security, would be a possibility if the variable annuity
is found by a federal court to be exclusively a security and not an
annuity. However, it seems that such securities regulation would
add little protection not already provided by insurance regulation.
The burden of such dual regulation therefore seems unjustified.
III. PROPOSED REGULATION
Although at the present time regulation of the variable annuity
under state insurance laws appears preferable to regulation under
federal laws, state insurance regulation has some serious defects as
a plan for complete protection of the variable annuity policyholder.
In order to fill these gaps, two comprehensive systems for the
regulation of variable annuities have been proposed. The first is a
set of recommendations by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC), 90 and the second is a set of bills proposed
ex. rel. American Indemnity Co. v. Brown, 189 Minn. 497, 250 N.W. 2
(1933).
Another defect in state insurance regulation is lack of uniformity. However, the same defect exists in securities regulation since state regulation is
specifically preserved. 48 Stat. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1952).
87. See text at note 29 supra. If the sale of a contract is not subject to
regulation in a particular state, then it should not be exempt under provisions
of 48 Stat. 76 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (8) (1952).
88. For example, the regulation of insurance advertising, 59 Stat. 34
(1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1952).
89. It is important to note that the investment industry is not foreclosed from the sale of variable life annuities by classifying them as insurance, since investment companies could enter the field, subject to adequate
regulation, by forming insurance companies to sell such contracts. 54 Stat.
808 (1940), 15 U.S.C. 80a-12(g) (1952).
90. The NAIC has not taken a position either for or against the sale of
variable annuities by life insurance companies. However, a committee has
drawn up recommendations for regulation in the event sale of these policies
is permitted. For the full text of these recommendations, see 1956 Proc. of
NAIC 164-65. These recommendations will hereinafter be cited as: NAIC
Proposal.
On the other hand, the National Association of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the National Association of Securities Administrators
are apparently not in doubt on the subject. The new Uniform Securities Act
provides for regulation of variable annuities as securities. See Loss and
Cowett, Blue Sky Law 350-51, 356-67 (1958).
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for enactment in New Jersey."' Also, the Insurance Commissioner
of West Virginia has actually promulgated rules based upon these
proposals to regulate the sale of variable annuities in that state. 2
A. AUTHORIZATION TO ISSUE VARIABLE ANNUITY POLICIES
Insurance companies
The proposed New Jersey bills specifically authorize issuance of
variable annuities by an insurance company. 3 This may be unnecessary since strong arguments can be made that insurance companies
could engage in the sale of variable annuities in most states without
changing existing statutes. However, specific legislative authorization would resolve any possible controversy and therefore appears
4
advisable.
Separate companies
The NAIC and a number of companies in the insurance industry
advocate that the sale of variable annuities be limited "to separate
and distinct companies limited to such activity. ' 5 On behalf of this
proposal it has been argued that the use of separate companies
would reduce the chance of public misunderstanding of the nature
of the contract by avoiding confusion with conventional insurance.96
In addition, it is believed by some that this separation will protect
91. New Jersey Assembly Bills Nos. 11, 12, and 13, introduced January
24, 1957 and referred to the Committee on Business Affairs. These and similar bills have been approved by the New Jersey Department of Banking and
Insurance but have failed to pass in 1955, 1956, and 1957. It is planned to
re-introduce the bills in 1958. See National Underwriter, Dec. 23, 1957, p. 9,
col. 3. No. 11 is a modification of New Jersey reserve laws; No. 12 authorizes an insurance company to establish a separate variable contract account;
and No. 13 contains most of the regulatory provisions for variable annuities.
The bills are sponsored by the Prudential Insurance Company of America
which has its home office in New Jersey. Bill No. 13 will hereinafter be cited
as: New Jersey Proposed Bill.
92. Official West Virginia Ins. Dept. Reg. 56L-2, Governing the Sale
of Contracts on a Variable Basis, August 29, 1956; hereinafter cited as:
West Virginia Rules. These rules were promulgated under rule making
power conferred by W. Va. Code Ann. § 3275 (1955) (later amended by
W. Va. Code Ann. § 3302 (Supp. 1957)).
93. New Jersey Proposed Bill No. 12, § 1.
94. A fraternal benefit society was enjoined from issuing a variable
endowment policy in Spellacy v. American Life Ins. Ass'n, 144 Conn. 346,
131 A.2d 834 (1957). An endowment is really a combined annuity and life
insurance policy. The court held that since "endowment' meant payment of
fixed sum benefits, the association was not authorized either by charter or
law to issue such variable policies.
95. NAIC Proposal 1.
96. Mitchell, 'Balance' the Big Issue in Inmtinnt Battles over Variable
Annuity Laws, National Underwriter, Jan. 6, 1956, p. 1, col. 2.
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the insurance industry from losing goodwill due to possible unfavor7
able experience with the variable annuity.
However, it seems doubtful that these ends will be accomplished
by using the legal sophistication of the separate corporate entity.
First, the relationship of the subsidiary to the parent may be revealed by the name of the subsidiary, advertising, or through representations made by agents. Secondly, if the same salesmen sell both
conventional insurance and variable annuities, the separation will
be indiscernible to the public. That this method of distribution probably will be used seems clear. It is cheaper than employing new
salesmen to sell only variable annuities since present salesmen already have established contacts, and natural since the average individual seeking information about the variable annuity will probably
ask his present agent. Furthermore, this method of distribution
seems more desirable than distribution by salesmen selling only
variable annuities since misrepresentation is less likely to occur
when a salesman has more than one product to sell.
Another claimed advantage of the separate company proposal
is that it may limit the scope of federal regulation to the subsidiary
if the variable annuity is found to be subject to such regulation. s
However, it seems doubtful that federal agents will be effectively
restrained by corporate form from probing into activities of the
parent which affect the subsidiary.
Finally, the proposal will cause economic waste. Most insurance companies will incur large expenses in organizing a subsidiary and licensing it in many states. Further, transfers of funds
between the two organizations due to changes in mortality experience and transfers back and forth from fixed to variable plans
would be more difficult and expensive than transfers within a
single company. 9
B.

LICENSING OF AGENTS

Along with the usual requirement for examination and licensing of agents, 00 the West Virginia commissioner requires that
agents selling variable annuities pass a special examination on that
subject.' 0'
97. See National Underwriter, Dec. 30, 1955, pp. 2, 15-16.
98. See id. at p. 15.
99. For a statement of objections to the use of separate companies, see
Kvernland, supra note 13, at 377-78.
100. E.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 114(2); see text at note 70 .upra.
101. W. Va. Rules § IV.
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C. POLICY FoRMs
In addition to the normal insurance regulatory controls over the
contents of policies,102 the proposals provide for certain other policy
standards.10 3 First, they require a clear statement on the first page
in "bold face type in contrasting color and in contrast with other
portions of the text" that the benefits are not guaranteed but
variable.' 0 ' Second, the policy must contain a guarantee of mortality
and expense factors. 0 5 Third, there must be a complete statement
of the specific procedures to be used in calculating payments and
benefits. 10 6 Fourth, there is a limitation on the amount of the first
payment to the policyholder which may be guaranteed.107 This
limitation is apparently designed to eliminate the possibility of the
policyholder being misled by an unreasonably high guaranteed first
payment to expect similar amounts thereafter. Fifth, in order to
discourage use of the variable annuity as a means of speculation,
the proposals provide that the cash value of the annuity cannot be
withdrawn in a lump sum. 08 Along this same line, the New Jersey
bill provides that the withdrawal payments must be made on a
variable basis over a period of three years."0
D. Busn-ss GETTING

METHODS

The insurance commissioner in most states already seems to
have sufficient power to regulate business getting methods through
misrepresentation and twisting statutes and the unfair trade practices acts. 10 The NAIC recommends these statutes."' The New
102. See text at notes 74-77 supra. All three regulatory schemes provide for filing and approval of variable annuity policy forms. W. Va. Rules
§ I(A); New Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(a); NAIC Proposal 5. Two of
the plans require nonforfeiture clauses. W. Va. Rules § III(E); New
Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(c) (1).
103. In addition to the proposals discussed i the text, all three plans
provide for annual reports to policyholders indicatting the number of units
credited and accumulated and the value per unit. New Jersey Proposed Bill
§ 3(c) (iii) ; NAIC Proposal 6; W. Va. Rule § VIII. All three provide for
limitations on the percentage of appreciated assets which may be withdrawn
for stockholders of a stock company. New Jersey Proposed Bill No. 12
§ 8; NAIC Proposal 10; W. Va. Rules § IX. Two prohibit borrowing for
the variable annuity fund or pledging its assets. New Jersey Proposed Bill
No. 12 § 4; NAIC Proposal 12.
104. W. Va. Rules § III (C) ; see New Jersey Proposed Bill § 2.
105. W. Va. Rules § I(1); New Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(e); NAIC
Proposal 9 (expenses only).
106. W. Va. Rules § III(B); New Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(e).
107. W. Va. Rules § III (H) ; New Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(e).
108. NAIC Proposal 8; New Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(d).
109. New Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(d) ; NAIC Proposal 8 (3-5 years).
110. See notes 78-81 supra and accompanying text. The New Jersey
Proposed Bill adds a sanction by providing that approval of the policy form
can be suspended if "sales of such contracts are being solicited by any
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Jersey bill, as an additional safeguard, specifically prohibits illustrations of benefits through projections of past investment experience into the future."12 However, such a prohibition seems of little
value since the prospective purchaser will instinctively make the
projection for himself. The West Virginia commissioner has added
a seemingly worthwhile provision that disclosure must be made
of whose past investment experience is being illustrated during
sales presentations and specifically that it is not the actual experience of the selling company." 3 Another safeguard could be provided by requiring on the application for the policy a statement to
the effect that the applicant understands that the benefits are variable and may go down as well as up, and that he understands the
importance of maintaining balance and continuing payments in
low market years.
E.

SEGREGATION OF PORTFOLIO

Unless separate companies are formed to sell variable annuities, the issuing company will have to segregate a portion of its
investment portfolio to establish the variable annuity fund. While
no statutes governing the investments and reserves of insurance
companies have been found which expressly prohibit such a segregation, it is not the traditional practice."14 However, since it is
clear that establishment of the fund is merely a means of accounting for payments and calculating benefits and is not intended to
grant to the variable annuity policyholder any preferred right to
the segregated assets in the event of liquidation, the practice should
be allowed. Nevertheless, specific legislative authorization for the
segregation has been sought in New Jersey" 5 and may be advisable in other states to resolve any possible controversy.
F. BALANCING
To reduce the effect of the severity of stock of stock market
lows on the variable annuity policyholders, it is agreed by all concerned that some sort of "balance," that is, combination of fixed
means of advertising, communication or dissemination of information which
involves misleading or inadequate description of the provisions of the contract." New Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(a) (ii). Apparently, this suspension
can become effective without notice or hearing and may remain effective
during appeal. See New Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(a).
111. NAIC Proposal 7.
112. New Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(b).
113. W. Va. Rules § V(B).
114. See Long, supra note 13, at 399.
115. New Jersey Proposed Bill No. 12 § 1. This bill, however, does not
explicitly state the rights on liquidation. It would seem preferable to add a
specific provision defining liquidation rights.
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and variable plans, is desirable. 1 6 Proposals have varied from
requiring balance 17 to only recommending balance to the annuitant.1 8 The proposed New Jersey legislation"19 and the rules
promulgated by the West Virginia commissioner 20 require that
balance be achieved only at the time a policy is purchased. This is
accomplished by prohibiting a company from accepting an application for a variable annuity policy unless the applicant already has,
or simultaneously will purchase, fixed value plans to balance against
the variable benefit plans.' 2 ' The NAIC would require not only
22
initial establishment but also maintenance of balance.
While the theory of insurance regulation is to some extent
paternalistic, the requirement of balance, referred to by some as
the "brother's keeper clause,"' 123 appears unprecedented. Such a
requirement is apparently designed to keep the purchaser from
spending his money foolishly. But the law has never attempted to
prohibit an individual from spending his money unwisely on insurance. For instance, the purchaser of conventional insurance is
not prohibited by law from overbuying, which may eventually result in loss of his entire program; or from spending all his money
on nonconvertible term insurance, although the results may be
disastrous. Further, it appears that most insurance companies will
voluntarily either impose appropriate balancing requirements or
strongly urge balance since goodwill may suffer if policyholders
have too much of their insurance programs in variable annuities
during a period of low stock prices. Also, overselling of variable
annuities could lead to cancelled policies which are costly to the
company. Finally, it is clear that any legal requirement of balance
24
would be extremely difficult to administer and enforce.
Probably the only real dangers in this area are from operations
of fly-by-night companies and overselling by agents. There are
116. Balancing thus establishes a floor on the benefits to be received, i.e.,

the amount of fixed benefits will be the least that the annuitant would receive. However, balancing also results in reducing the peaks in the market.

117. See NAIC Proposal 2. The teachers plan, for instance, provides
for rigid maintenance of at least a 50-50 balance. See Kvernland, mtpra note

13, at 376; Day and Melnikoff, The Variable Annuity As a Life Insurance
Company Product, 10 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 45, 47 (1955).
118. Kvernland, mtpra note 13, at 375-77.

119. New Jersey Proposed Bill § 3(a) (iii).
120. W. Va. Rules § II.
121. This requirement is enforced through the power to revoke approval

of use of the variable annuity policy form. See New Jersey Proposed Bill
§ 3(a) (iii). Regarding what may be considered as "fixed" benefit plans, see
Kvernland, supra note 13, at 375-77; Mitchell, supra note 96, at p. 1.
122. NAIC Proposal 2.
123. See Kvernland, mspra note 13, at 375.
124. Id. at 375-77; Mitchell, mspra note 96, at p. 16.
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effective ways to limit such activities without restricting the amount
of policies which a purchaser may acquire. First, companies can be
discouraged from entering this field by placing limitations on the
amount which can be deducted from the gross premium by the
company for expenses and management fees. If this amount is
placed at a relatively low, although reasonable, level in comparison
with other insurance policies, there will be little temptation for the
"fast buck" promoter to enter this field for a "killing." Further,
agents can be discouraged from overselling variable annuities by
requiring commissions on such policies to be substantially lower
than commissions on other insurance policies.1 25 Although not
traditional in the regulation of insurance, such requirements would
effectively prevent large scale overselling and fly-by-night operations and yet preserve the freedom of an individual to choose the
program best suited to his needs.

G.

INVESTMENT CONTROLS

While protection of policyholders through controls on investments may restrict a public interest in freedom of investment, this
conflict has traditionally been resolved in favor of the former.
Quantitativestandards
Typically, insurance companies are allowed to invest only five
to ten percent of their total assets in common stocks. 26 Consequently, it will not be long until the variable annuity portfolio will
reach such a size that a company will have to liquidate other common stocks held by the company so that the overall proportion of
common stocks to the entire assets will not exceed the amount allowed by law. However, policyholder suits could result from such
action since dividends on conventional policies probably would decrease if the company has to allocate all of its common stock to the
variable annuity account. This problem should be solved at an
early stage in order to avoid such difficulties in later years.
In order to avoid control of other corporations by insurance
companies, state insurance codes commonly provide a limit, typi125. Prudential Insurance Company has stated that its variable annuity
contracts would provide for less than one-half the commission on a normal
life insurance policy. Hearing, mtpra note 1, at 32. However, this does not
necessarily mean that Prudential has any intention of paying lower commissions on variable annuities than on other individual annuities. Commissions on annuities of any type are usually lower percentage-wise than on

conventional life insurance policies.
126. E.g., Pa. Stat Ann. tit. 40, § 506.1(g) (2) (Purdon 1954) (5%6);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 61.11(5) (Supp. 1957) (10%).
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cally five percent, 127 on the percentage of the stock of another corporation which may be held by an insurance company. The West
Virginia rules specify that this limitation shall be five percent for
any company which sells variable annuities, 28 while the NAIC
recommends three percent. 2 9 Such a standard appears to afford
substantial protection from use of the fund as a vehicle for control
without unduly restraining freedom of investment.
To insure that any one loss will not have a substantial adverse
effect on the entire portfolio, it is common practice to diversify
investments. However present insurance laws do not adequately
require such diversification. When such requirements exist,8 0
they are phrased in terms of percentages of the entire assets of the
company which may be invested in any one corporation. While
such limitations may provide sufficient protection for the policyholders as a whole of a conventional insurance company, they are
grossly inadequate to protect variable annuity policyholders. The
insurance company can invest the entire variable annuity fund in
one corporation and yet remain within a percentage of total assets
limitation. It would seem advisable, therefore, to set a limit on
the percentage of the variable annuity fund, considered separately,
which may be used to hold the stock of any one company.
Qualitative standards
Most states impose qualitative standards for the common stocks
which may be purchased by an insurance company. The standard
most often used is that the company whose stock is purchased must
have had a specified percentage of earnings available for dividends
on its common stock during a certain number of years,' 31 usually
about four, immediately prior to the purchase. On the whole, these
standards are satisfactory, although they may prove too restrictive
during and just after a severe recession.
Another common qualitative standard is the requirement that
8 2
only stocks listed on a national exchange may be purchased.
13
Both the NAIC ' and the West Virginia riles 84 provide for such
127. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 73, § 737(3) (Smith-Hurd 1957) (5%).
128. W. Va. Rules § VI(2).

129. NAIC Proposal 3(b).

130. Pa. Stat Ann. tit. 40, § 50 6. 1 (g) (1) (Purdon 1954) (2%);
W. Va. Rules § VI(4) (2%). The NAIC has no specific recommendation.

131. E.g., Minn. Stat Ann. § 61.11 (5) (b) (Supp. 1957). The NAIC

has recommended such a provision. NAIC Proposal 3(c). In West Virginia
and New Jersey, the company would be subject to the usual laws governing
investment of insurance companies. The Minnesota standards, cited above,
are based on the meaningless concept of par value, unfortunately.
132. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat c. 73, § 737(3) (Smith-Hurd 1957).
133. NAIC Proposal 3 (d).
134. W. Va. Rules § VI(5).
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a limitation. Considering the protections furnished through regulation of listed stocks 35 and the volume of such stocks available,- 36
it seems that the advantages of such a restriction outweigh the
disadvantages.
The NAIC 13 and the West Virginia rules 38 provide for a
prohibition on purchases of stock which will result in "conflicts of
interest, including any between officers and directors of the variable
annuity company and the corporation whose stock is purchased."'
If strictly interpreted and enforced, such a provision could be a
serious limitation both on the stocks which could be purchased and
the availability of capable officers and directors to head insurance
companies. Further, the proposal seems unnecessary since the
common law already provides sufficient controls over abuses arising out of conflicts of interest.
Both the NAIC140 and West Virginia' 4' prohibit investment in
the common stock of any insurance company, national or state bank,
or trust company. This restriction is probably designed to avoid
interlocking of institutional investors and acquisition of stocks
which may be subject to assessment.
When taken together, the limitations recommended above may
restrict investments of insurance companies to such a narrow
market that inflation in value of eligible stocks will eventually result.
It would seem that the dangers which these limitations are designed
to prevent can be largely eliminated by expressing certain restrictions in terms of percentage limitations rather than as absolute
prohibitions. For example, a small percentage of the variable annuity portfolio, perhaps five to ten percent, could be allowed for
purchasing unlisted securities and institutional stocks not subject
to assessment.
135. National exchanges must register with the SEC under provisions
of the Securities Act of 1934. The exchanges regulate and discipline members
for violations of the securities law and exchange rules; the SEC has power
over certain substantive areas of these rules. Over-the-counter brokers are

subject to some regulation, however. See Loss, Securities Regulation 84-85
(1951).
136. As of June 30, 1956 there were 2,659 stocks listed; on Dec. 31,

1955, the unduplicated market value of listed stock issues was $238,832,003,000.

22 SEC Ann. Rep. 91-94 (1956).
137. NAIC Proposal 3(e).
138. W. Va. Rules § VI(C).
139. NAIC Proposal3(e).
140. NAIC Proposal 3(a).
141. W. Va. Rules § VI(I).
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FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF GRIEVANCE
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS UNDER THE DOCTRINE
OF LINCOLN MILLS
INTRODUCTION

A collective bargaining agreement is an agreement resulting
from negotiations between an employer and the union representing
its employees, which provides standards to govern their labor
relations. The agreement differs from the familiar commercial contract in which the parties generally provide for every essential
term of the particular transaction involved. The commercial contract
is usually intended to fix as rigidly as possible the legal obligations
of each party notwithstanding future changes in economic conditions. In the collective bargaining agreement, however, the parties
almost invariably intend to keep their obligations adaptable to
changing conditions through the process of renegotiation. No matter
how much time the parties devote to negotiation, a careful consideration of all the problem areas-for example, new work processes, overtime, promotions, and layoffs-in the light of all possible changes in economic and social conditions would be impossible. The agreement provides only the framework for an autonomous system of self-government under which the private enterprise can function effectively in spite of changing circumstances or
unforeseeable problems.'
Labor relations problems frequently arise for which the existing
agreement provides no specific solution. These problems are generally handled through a grievance settlement procedure, established
by the agreement, which includes conferences between various company and union officials. If all the conferences are unsuccessful, the
agreements commonly provide for arbitration of the dispute as the
final step in the grievance procedure. The purpose of this Note is
to survey the extent to which these arbitration agreements can be
enforced in the federal courts, particularly under the recent Supreme
Court decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 2 and
to suggest some possible improvements in the law regarding their
enforcement.
THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
Arbitration has been defined as:
The reference of a dispute by voluntary agreement of the parties
to an impartial person for determination on the basis of evil. For a general discussion of collective bargaining agreements, see
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L. Rev.

999 (1955).
2. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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dence and argument presented by such parties, who agree in
advance to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and
binding. Arbitration, therefore, is a judicial proceeding and
different in nature from mediation, conciliation, negotiation and
other forms of dispute settlement.'
But the arbitrator, like a probate or juvenile court, has only limited
jurisdiction as opposed to the general jurisdiction of a district court.
The arbitrator's jurisdiction extends only to disputes which he is
authorized to arbitrate under the terms of the particular contract
arbitration provision, that is, only to arbitrable disputes. The arbitration clause may be strictly limited to a few carefully defined types
of disputes, it may be applicable to all problems of interpreting and
applying the other provisions of the contract, or it may extend to
any dispute concerning the employment relationship during the time
the contract is in effect even though the contract does not deal with
the particular problem area. 4 Thus, when negotiating the terms of
the agreement, the parties determine on which issues an arbitrator's
award would be acceptable should they themselves fail to reach a
settlement.
A court may be called upon to enforce the arbitration provision
in three ways. First, damages may, and often will, be awarded for
losses suffered due to the defendant's failure to arbitrate, although
in many cases it is very difficult to establish the amount of damages.
3. American Arbitration Association, Labor Arbitration-Procedures and
Techniques 3 (1957).
4. Although most collective bargaining agreement arbitration clauses
provide for arbitration of grievances, some provide for arbitration of disagreements during the negotiation of terms for a new contract. This Note is
concerned with grievance arbitration but a brief comment on new contract
arbitration is appropriate. In Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter
Press, 241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir. 1957), the Court of Appeals distinguished
between enforceable "quasi-judicial" arbitration of grievances under an
existing contract, and unenforceable "quasi-legislative" arbitration of disputes over new contract terms. This distinction turned on the court's construction of the United States Arbitration Act, 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1952), but it was apparently based on the policy that no
arbitrator should perform the function of making the parties' contract for
them. However, the whole arbitration process is contrary to this policy; each
time an arbitrator settles a dispute by handing down an enforceable final
award, he is in effect making a new contract provision. There seems to be
little justification for permitting the arbitrator to form new provisions for
an existing contract, but not to form provisions for a future contract to
replace the existing one when it expires; in either case, the parties have
voluntarily agreed to let the arbitrator settle their dispute. Nevertheless,
the distinction has been made, and it is possible that some courts might consider "quasi-legislative" arbitration agreements unenforceable as contrary
to public policy. See Note, Federal Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate
New Contract Terms, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 284 (1957).
5. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 25 v. W. L.
Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956) (employer awarded $359,000
damages). In awarding damages, the courts enforce the party's common law
right to damages for breach of contract.
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Second, the parties may be ordered to comply with the arbitrator's
final award' on the rationale that the award is an addendum to the
contract. 7 Courts have been very willing to follow this method.
Third, a mandatory injunction may be issued ordering a defaulting party to submit to arbitration." The court compels the
parties to accept their own voluntary selection of arbitration as
the procedure for settling their disputes. This Note is concerned
primarily with the third method, specific enforcement of executory
arbitration agreements.
At common law an agreement to arbitrate future grievances was
unenforceable, apparently because the courts were opposed to compelling a reluctant party to submit to an arbitrator instead of to
the courts for adjudication of his dispute.9 Nevertheless, once the
parties submitted to arbitration, courts would enforce the final
award. 10 However, modern legislative policy has favored enforcing
even executory arbitration agreements in order to promote industrial peace."
UNITED STATES ARBITRATIOn€ ACT

The United States Arbitration Act 12 provides that contract arbitration clauses "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."'13 The act empowers a federal court having jurisdiction under a separate statute to order compliance with an arbi6. Katz and Jaffe, Enforcing Labor Arbitration Clauses by Section 301,
Taft-Hartley Act, 8 Arb. J. (n.s.) 80, 81 (1953). The courts enforce the
party's common law right to enforcement of the award. See Bayne v. Morris,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 97 (1863); Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344
(1854) ; Karthaus v. Ferrer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 222 (1828).
See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Local :721 v. Central of Georgia
Ry., 229 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1956), where the court refused to enjoin a strike
which violated an arbitrator's award. However, in that case the request was
for a temporary injunction while the controversy was pending before the
Railroad Adjustment Board. When the arbitration award is considered valid
and final, the court may be able to enjoin the strike. See Milk and Ice Cream
Drivers Union, Local 98 v. Gillespie Milk Products Corp., 203 F.2d 650 (6th
Cir. 1953). But see Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
7. Katz and Jaffe, supra note 6, at 81.
8. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448

(1957).

9. See Tobey v.County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 14065, at 1320-21
(C.C. Mass. 1845).
10. Vynior's Case, 8 Coke 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (1609). See Red
Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 118-22 (1923) ; Cox, Soine
Lawyers' Problems in Grievance Arbitration, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 41, 42-43
(1955).

11.

55 (1957).

See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453-

12. 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).

13. 61 Stat. 670 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
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tration clause in a "contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce."' 4 Although that language tends to indicate that the act
should apply to collective bargaining agreements, the legislative
history and the contemporaneous commentaries support the conclusion that Congress was concerned solely with the enforcement of
arbitration agreements in commercial contracts."b Prior to 1947,
there were apparently no cases in which the provisions of the act
were invoked to enforce a collective bargaining arbitration clause.
More recently, however, there have been frequent attempts to enforce such clauses under the act, and the courts have split on the
question whether a collective bargaining agreement is a "contract
of employment," to which the act is expressly inapplicable.' 6
The United States Supreme Court has not clearly resolved the
question of applicability of the act to collective bargaining agreements even though cases adopting each view have reached the
Court.' 7 In one case, where the lower court had granted specific
14. Ibid. The court must have jurisdiction "of the subject matter of the
suit arising out of the controversy between the parties." 61 Stat. 671 (1947),

9 U.S.C. § 4 (1952). See 61 Stat. 672 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1952), for

special jurisdictional rules relating to the arbitrator's final award.
15. Writers commenting upon the Arbitration Act did not discuss its
relationship to labor contracts; they apparently did not consider the act
as relating to anything but commercial contracts. See, e.g., Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Act
and Its Application, 11 A.B.A.J. 153 (1925); Bernheimer, The United
States ArbitrationAct, 3 West Pub. Co. Docket 2928 (1925). See also Oliver,
The Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 206 (1934), where the
author analyzes the methods of labor arbitration without mentioning the
Arbitration Act.
16. Although the Arbitration Act empowers a federal court to order
compliance with an arbitration clause in a "contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce," 61 Stat. 670 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1952), the act
does not apply to "contracts of employment" of workers "engaged in ...
commerce." 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). Courts have not
agreed whether a collective bargaining agreement is a contract of employment.
For cases holding that the Arbitration Act does not apply to collective
bargaining agreements, see United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Manufacturing Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1957); Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S.
448 (1957) ; Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Coach Employees, Division 1063, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952) ; International
Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardware Flooring Co., 168
F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).
For contrary holdings, see Local 205, United Electrical Workers v.
General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85 (lst Cir. 1956), aff'd on other grounds,
353 U.S. 547 (1957) ; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, Local
327, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954); Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture
Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
For a discussion of these cases, see Mendelsohn, Enforceability of
Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 Yale L.J. 167,
172-79 (1956).
17. Compare General Electric Co. v. Local 205, United Electrical
Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957), with Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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enforcement of the arbitration agreement on the basis of the act,
the Court implied that the act was not applicable:
We follow in part a different path than the Court of Appeals,
though we reach the same result.18
Nevertheless some provisions of the act may be useful guides for
federal courts in enforcing arbitration agreements, and these provision will be discussed in greater detail later in this Note.
TAFT-HARTLEY

§ 301

AND LINCOLN MILLS

The different path followed by the Supreme Court was § 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act which provides, in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in
an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act shall be
bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may
sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom
it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money
judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the
United States shall be enforceable only against the organization
as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable
against any individual member or his assets. 19
Section 301 obviously was designed to confer federal jurisdiction
over cases involving breach of a collective bargaining agreement
without regard to diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy,
but it is not clear whether or not Congress also intended the section
to create federal substantive rights. This problem was raised in
Lincoln Mills and two companion cases, General Electric Co. v.
Local 205, United Electric Workers" and Goodall-Sanford, Inc.
v. United Textile Workers, Local 1882,21 where the Supreme Court
held that an arbitration agreement is enforceable as a matter of
substantive right under § 301 (a).22 Although in each of these cases
18. General Electric Co. v. Local 205, United Electrical Workers, 353

U.S. 547, 548 (1957).

19. 61 Stat 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952').
20. 353 U.S.547 (1957).
21. 353 U.S. 550 (1957).

22. The Court's holding that § 301 created substantive rights resolved a

division of authority in the federal courts. For a discussion of that division of
authority, see Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Under
Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 Yale L.J. 167, 169-70 (1956).
Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion was joined by Mr. Chief Justice
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it was the union which sought an injunction compelling the employer to arbitrate, the Court interpreted Taft-Hartley to express
agreebroad legislative policy for enforcing collective bargaining
23
ments both on behalf of and against labor organizations.
The Lincoln Mills doctrine runs clearly contrary to the philosophy that the law serves no useful function in the adjustment of
labor disputes. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Lincoln Mills,
states:

[J]udicial intervention is ill-suited to the special claracteristics
of the arbitration process in labor disputes .... 'The arbitration is
an integral part of the system of self-government. And the system is designed to aid management in its quest for efficiency, to
assist union leadership in its participation in the enterprise,
and to secure justice for the employees. It is a means of making
collective bargaining work and thus preserving private enterprise in a free government. When it works fairly well, it does not
need the sanction of the law of contracts or the law of arbitration. It is only when the system breaks down completely that
the courts' aid in these respects is invoked. But the courts cannot, by occasional sporadic decision, restore the parties' continuing relationship; and their intervention in such cases may
seriously affect the going systems of self-government. When
their autonomous system breaks down, might not the parties
better be left to the usual methods for adjustment of labor discourt actions on the contract or on the
putes rather than to
2
arbitration award ?'1
But enforcing the arbitration agreement may not be entirely inWarren, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Whittaker;
Mr. Justice Burton's concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, asserted that the arbitration clause is enforceable, but that the substantive law
applicable under § 301 is state not federal law; Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented, principally on the grounds that he believed § 301 created no federal
substantive law, and that Congress has no constitutional power to confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts over cases involving state law except where
there is diversity of citizenship; Mr. Justice Black took no part in the case.
The Court's holding calls for a case by case development of a federal law of
labor contracts. For a critical analysis of this holding, see Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1957). This holding goes far beyond the application of § 301 to arbitration agreements and the scope of this Note.
23. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter disagrees with the majority interpretation of
Congress' intent, and sets out the legislative history of § 301 in an appendix
to his dissenting opinion. Id. at 485-546. See Mendelsohn, Enforceability of
Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 Yale L.J. 167,
184 (1956).
See Local 205, United Electrical Workers v. General Electric Co., 233
F.2d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 547 (1957), where the court states
that an arbitration agreement is enforceable against either party to the labor
dispute.
24. 353 U.S. at 462-64 (emphasis added). The quotation is from Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999,
1024 (1955).
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consistent with this judicial "hands-off" policy. The court intervenes
only to the extent of compelling submission of the dispute to arbitration. It is the arbitrator and not the court who resolves the
dispute. The arbitrator, selected by the parties themselves to make
these decisions, is normally a labor relations expert who understands the "special characteristics" of the dispute far better than
do courts. He often deals primarily or even exclusively with labor
problems. Unlike a court, the arbitrator could be considered an
essential part of a successful autonomous system of self-government.
Unhampered by rigid and formal procedural requirements, the
arbitrator is better able to arrive at a sound and speedy result.
The "hands-off" philosophy tends to minimize the public interest
in preventing the tremendous impact of industrial warfare on the
public, aside from its affect on the employers and workers in the
particular industry involved. Perhaps the Court felt this substantial
public interest outweighed the interest of preventing judicial intervention into this type of labor relations problem. The Lincoln Mills
majority stated:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the
quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this
light, the legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in the
federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal
policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on
behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrialpeace
can be best obtained only in that way.... We would undercut
the Act and defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly as only
conferring jurisdiction over labor organizations.25
Desirable or not, the Lincoln Mills doctrine has been established,
and the law must develop accordingly. Analysis of this doctrine will
show that the development of federal substantive law may be arduous for three reasons: (1) the scope of federal jurisdiction under
§ 301 is unclear; (2) the courts are given insufficient procedural
guidance to develop federal law of labor arbitration effectively; and
(3) the power of the court to enjoin certain acts may conflict with
the federal anti-injunction laws.
A.

ScoPE OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The Westinghouse Case
Jurisdiction under § 301 is limited to violations of a contract
between an employer and a labor organization or a contract between
labor organizations. 26 Thus, a union has no standing under § 301
25. 353 U.S. at 455, 456.
26. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
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to enforce rights of an employee which do not arise from the collective bargaining agreement. Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.27 presented the question whether employee claims to back pay wrongfully withheld arose
from the collective bargaining agreement or whether such claims
were uniquely personal rights arising solely from the individual
hiring contracts. By a sharply divided Supreme Court, it was held
that the union had no standing to enforce these claims.
In Lincoln Mills and its companion cases the Court enforced
the arbitration of grievances similar to those in Westinghouse.
Thus, the question arises whether Westinghouse is still good law.
A comparison of Westinghouse with these later cases suggests three
alternative conclusions: (1) the later cases are distinguishable from
Westinghouse on the basis of the type of grievance involved; (2)
Westinghouse is now, in effect, overruled; or (3) "enforcing arbitration clauses benefits the union, and so the union may sue in its
own right, whereas a claim for wages concerns only the men, and
2
so must be sued for by them."
Under the first alternative, standing would depend upon the
facts involved in the underlying grievance. Close inquiry into the
facts of the four cases discloses that there is no relevant distinction
among them. The grievances involved were as follows: Lincoln
Mills-work loads and work assignments ;29 General Electricwage rates and a wrongful discharge ;30 Goodall-Sanford-wrongful
lay-offs ;31 Westinghouse-wage claims.3 2 In all four cases the union
was pressing for settlement of grievances between the employer and
individual identified employees, not between the employer and the

union in its representative capacity. One authority has properly
concluded that:
The only factual difference ...between the cases is that in West-

inghouse the contract did not obligate the parties to arbitrate
disputes, so that when the grievance procedure of the contract
had been carried through without success the only action left
was one for wages.2 3
27. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
28. Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 Va. L. Rev. 1247, 1248 (1957).
29. 353 U.S. at 449.
30. For a statement of the facts, see Local 205, United Electrical Workers v. General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85, 89 (lst Cir. 1956).
31. For a statement of the facts, see United Textile Workers v. GoodallSanford, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 767 (D. Me. 1955).
32. 348 U.S. at 439.
33. Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 Va. L. Rev. 1247, 1249 (1957).

1958]

NOTES

1147

It follows that the first conclusion is not correct. Therefore, so long
as the grievance is arbitrable, the union does have standing under
§ 301 to sue for enforcement of the arbitration clause, because
either the second or third conclusion, if correct, would dearly require that result. Consequently, the Westinghowse issue can be
avoided in every case where the collective bargaining agreement
contains an arbitration clause broad enough to encompass all the
important incidents of the employment relationship.
Unfair labor practices
Exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
over cases involving "unfair labor practices" as defined in § 8 of
the National Labor Relations Act3 4 could interfere with § 301 suits
in two ways. First, a court may hold that an act which is contrary
to the arbitration provision is not an actionable breach of contract
when it is done solely in protest to an act by the other party which
could reasonably be deemed an unfair labor practice within the
Board's jurisdiction. For example, when a union strikes to protest
the employer's unfair labor practice, a court may hold that the
strike does not violate the contract arbitration or no-strike clauses.35
Second, the court has no jurisdiction over a controversy where the
plaintiff is complaining of an act or omission which itself is an unfair
labor practice. Thus, compensating employees for wages lost due
to the employer's unfair labor practice is a matter for the NLRB
exclusively.38 It is well settled that violation of a collective bargaining agreement does not in itself constitute an unfair labor practice.3 7
The Board has stated:
The Board is not the proper forum for parties seeking to remedy
an alleged breach of contract or to obtain specific enforcement
of its terms.38
It could be argued, though, that refusing to arbitrate in accord
with the grievance procedure is refusing to bargain collectively, an
34. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952). For cases holding that

a controversy involving an unfair labor practice is outside the jurisdiction of
federal courts, see Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167
F2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Coach Employees
v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 170 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1948); International
Longshoremen's Union, Local 6 v. Sunset Line & Twine Co., 77 F. Supp.
119 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
35. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
36. See Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d
183 (4th Cir. 1948).
37. See, e.g., Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
235 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1956). See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electrical Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 443 n. 2 (1955)
(opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
38. United Telephone Co. of the West and International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, 112 N.L.R.B. 779, 782 (1955).
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unfair labor practice under §§ 8(a)(5) or 8(b) (3). 31 At least
refusal by one party to arbitrate can be used as a defense by the
other party to a charge that the latter has refused to bargain; the
latter party can insist that bargaining follow the prescribed grievance settlement procedure. 40 One authority has stated that:
If either of the parties to a collective bargaining agreement
requests the other to participate in the processing of a grievance
in accordance with the procedure established therein, the refusal
of the other will constitute a violation of Section 8(a) (5) or
8(b) (3)_41
However, no court has held that refusal to arbitrate is an unfair
labor practice, and the Board has carefully avoided making that
ruling.

42

The history of the Taft-Hartley Act seems persuasive that
Congress did not intend § 8 to include a refusal to arbitrate. The
House and Senate bills on the Taft-Hartley Act both included provisions referring to arbitration. 43 The Conference Committee stated:

[The provision] would have made it an unfair labor practice to
violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or an
agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration.The conference agreement omits [these provisions]. Once parties have
made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that
of the law and not
contract should be left to the usual processes
44
to the National Labor Relations Board.
Unless this policy is changed, it seems likely that courts will lose
jurisdiction to the Board only when the grievance the plaintiff seeks
to have arbitrated is itself an unfair labor practice. Except in the
two situations mentioned above - where the alleged breach of contract is a protest against an unfair labor practice or where the
grievance is itself an unfair labor practice - enforcement of an
arbitration agreement under § 301 probably will not be precluded
by the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
39. 49 Stat. 452 (1935) and 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (a)(5), (b)(3) (1952).
40. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
41. Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law 359 (1953). (Emphasis
added.)
42. "[T]he Board does not hold that a failure to arbitrate a dispute is in
itself a refusal to bargain in violation of the [National Labor Relations]
Act." United Telephone Co. of the West and International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, 112 N.L.R.B. 779, 781 (1955). See also Textron Puerto
Rico (Tricot Division) and Textile Workers Union, Local 24,877, 107
N.L.R.B. 583 (1953).
43. See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947); S. Rep.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1947).
44. H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1947). (Emphasis
added.)
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INSUFFICIENT GUIDANCE

In Lincoln Mills the Supreme Court ruled that courts must
create the substantive law which is to apply in § 301 cases:
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under
§ 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws... The Labor Management
Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It
points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but
will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and
fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range
of judicial45 inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the
problem.
Thus, a court enforcing an arbitration clause under § 301 faces the
formidable task of creating applicable law, guided only by the general policy of the national labor laws.
Although the Lincoln Mills dictum quoted above delegates to
lower courts the tremendous responsibility of molding an entire
body of collective bargaining contract law, the courts' task in connection with enforcing arbitration clauses is limited primarily to
developing a standard procedure for court enforcement. Suits for
enforcement of an arbitration clause will reach a court in one of
four ways. The plaintiff may seek: (1) damages for breach of an
arbitration clause; (2) a mandatory injunction ordering the defendant's submission to arbitration in accordance with the contract
clause; (3) a stay of proceedings against him pending arbitration
under the clause; or (4) confirmation, modification or vacation of
an arbitrator's final award. In each type of case, once the court has
determined that the parties' grievance is arbitrable within the provisions of a valid collective bargaining contract-a matter of contract
law and contract interpretation - the court need only determine the
proper procedure for enforcing the arbitration clause. Still, unanswered questions may arise whether, for example, the court can
appoint an arbitrator for the parties if they themselves are unable
to agree upon one; whether the court can compel witnesses to
appear before the arbitrator; whether the court must have personal
jurisdiction over both parties before confirming, modifying or
changing the arbitrator's award. Courts must find answers to these
and other similar procedural questions before they can develop a
consistent federal policy toward labor arbitration. The Taft-Hartley
Act does not provide any standard enforcement procedures, and it
45. 353 U.S. at 456-57. (Emphasis added.)
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is a little difficult to find answers to the procedural questions in the
"policy of our national laborlaws."'"
The United States Arbitration Act provides standard procedures
for court enforcement of arbitration agreements, but that act was
apparently never intended to be a "national labor law."' 7 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter states in his Lincoln Mills dissent:
Naturally enough, I find rejection, though not explicit, of the
availability of the Federal Arbitration Act to enforce arbitration clauses in collective-bargaining agreements4 8 in the silent
treatment given that Act by the Court's opinion.
If Justice Frankfurter's reading of the Lincoln Mills majority opinion is correct, then the Arbitration Act is not one of the national
labor laws to which courts must look for guidance in § 301 cases.
Nevertheless, at least one federal court has been willing to rely on a
procedural provision of the act for power to appoint an arbitrator,
although the court rejected the act as a basis for enforcing a collective bargaining contract arbitration clause.4 9 This practice of lifting
particular sections from federal statutes and applying them out of
context according to the particular needs of the case before the court
is not likely to promote either sound or uniform law.
The Lincoln Mills Court further instructed the lower courts:
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state
law.... But state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301,
may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy .... Any state law applied, however, will
be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source
of private rights.50
This rule allows a court to freely apply or reject the state law depending upon whether, in the judge's opinion, that law is compatible
with the purpose of § 301. 1' Whether or not a particular state rule
46. See text at note 45 supra.
47. See note 15 supra.
48. 353 U.S. at 466.
49. See Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp.
137 (D. Mass. 1953) ; cf. Local 149, American Federation of Technical Engineers v. General Electric Co., 250 F2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957).

50. 353 U.S. at 457.

51. Procedural rules differ considerably among the states. A comparison
of state provisions for judicial review of arbitrator's awards, for example,

discloses that in Arizona an award is final unless the right of appeal is
expressly reserved in the arbitration agreement, although the Arizona court
has indicated that an award may be challenged on grounds of fraud or
mistake. Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 12-1506 (1956) ; U.S. v. Ellis, 2 Ariz. 253,
14 Pac. 300 (1887). In New Mexico an arbitration agreement must contain a
provision that the parties agree not to question the arbitrator's award. N.M.
Stat Ann. § 22-3-4 (1953). But in Maine the award must be submitted to a
court, and that court has discretion to accept, reject, or recommit the award.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 121, § 5 (1954). Many states have provisions for
vacation or correction of awards on grounds of fraud, corruption or mistake;
many others have no provision at all for judicial review of the award.
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is compatible with the elusive "purpose" of § 301 appears to be a
rather speculative matter on which courts are likely to reach conflicting decisions. The Supreme Court divided sharply over the congressional purpose of § 301,52 and subsequent action by the Court has
possibly made even the position of the majority equivocal. 53
Since the Taft-Hartley Act does not expressly pre-empt § 301
jurisdiction to the federal courts, state courts probably will also
take part in developing the applicable substantive law." At least
one state court has already deemed it proper to enforce the federal
rights created by § 301,' 5 and recent federal action may encourage
more state litigation of § 301 cases. 56 The confusion likely to result
from conflicting decisions among the courts of the federal circuits
will be multiplied by decisions of state and territorial courts.
C. CONFLICT WITH THE FEDERAL ANTI-INJuNcTION ACT

The Lincoln Mills decision established that a federal court's
order compelling a party to submit to arbitration does not violate
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which restricts federal jurisdiction to
issue injunctions in labor disputes. Norris-LaGuardia § 1 provides,
in part:
That no court of the United States, as herein defined, shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a
52. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
53. See note 56 infra.
54. The Supreme Court has held that a state court must enforce the
federal rights created by an act of Congress if the court's "ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion," unless Congress has given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over these cases.
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 55-58 (1912). See
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876). See also Hart The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 906 08 (1954). Generally courts have held that § 301 does not grant exclusive jurisdiction, and
that state courts can enforce the federal rights that § 301 creates. See, e.g.,
McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 315 P.2d
322 (Cal. 1957), cert denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) ; Associated Tel. Co. v.
Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal, 1953) ; General Electric Co. v. International Union United Automobile Workers, 93 Ohio App.
139, 108 N.E.2d, 211 (1952), appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 555, 110 N.E.2d
424 (1953). But see Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, 98 F. Supp. 278

(S.D.N.Y. 1951).

55. See McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 315 P.2d 322 (Cal. 1957), cert denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
56. Compare Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) (federal court has no jurisdiction to grant a strike injunction to enforce § 301 rights), with McCarroll v.
Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 315 P.2d 322 (Cal. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) (state court has jurisdiction to grant a
strike injunction to enforce § 301 rights where state statutes do not preclude
that power).
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except in strict conformity with the provisions of
labor dispute,
57
this Act.
Section 7 of the act prescribes strict requirements which must be
met before an injunction may be granted in a labor dispute. The
petitioner must prove:
(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be
committed unless restrained or have been committed and will
be continued unless restrained...;
(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's
property will follow;
(c) That. . . greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants
by the granting of relief;
(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect
are unable or unwilling to furnish adecomplainant's property
58
quate protection.
These requirements were clearly designed to limit injunctions to
acts of violence, and the petitioner ordinarily cannot satisfy the requirements in an action to enforce an arbitration clause. 59 The
Lincoln Mills Court stated:
Though a literal reading might bring the dispute within the
terms of the [Norris-LaGuardia] Act ... we see no justification
in policy for restricting § 301 (a) to damage suits, leaving specific performance of a contract to arbitrate grievance disputes
to the inapposite procedural requirements of that act. 60
The decision raised the question whether or not § 301 suits are
exempt from other more specific provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act when the Court can see no policy justification for applying
57. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).

58. 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1952).
59. See Local 205, United Electrical Workers v. General Electric Co.,
233 F.2d 85, 92 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
60. 353 U.S. at 458. (Emphasis added.)
In a footnote following the word inapposite the Court cited Local 205,
United Electrical Workers v. General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85, 92 (1st Cir.
1956), where the circuit court had concluded that:
The enumerated requisites [in § 7], which draw a logical line in relation to union conduct in strikes and picketing (and perhaps to some
employer activities), are not at all compatible with the situation where
one party merely demands that the other be compelled to arbitrate a
grievance in accordance with a contract provision for arbitration, in
which latter situation the required findings seldom, if ever, could be
made either affirmatively or negatively.
The Supreme Court did not indicate whether it approved the circuit court's
position that "an order to arbitrate could not be accompanied by an injunction against the strike," 233 F._d at 93 (emphasis added), or whether it
would approve a strike injunction in order to effectively enforce the arbitration clause and promote industrial peace.
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those provisions. Section 4 provides that no federal court has jurisdiction to issue "any restraining order or temporary or permanent
injunction" against striking or peaceful picketing in a labor dispute
case, except in conformity with the stringent requirements of § 7.61
Section 4 applies regardless of the strikers' motives or whether
the strike is justified.

62

The Taft-Hartley Act does not expressly authorize a federal
court to enjoin a strike which violates the arbitration clause or
its companion 63 no-strike clause, and the question arose in the
Bull Steamship cases 64 whether the Lincoln Mills interpretation of
§ 301 lifted the Norris-LaGuardia injunction ban with respect to
strikes in breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Bull Steamship Cases
The federal district court granted temporary strike injunctions
in these cases reasoning that according to Lincoln Mills, § 301 was
meant to "insure faithful performance of the entire [collective bargaining] agreement to the end that there should be industrial
peace." ' These decisions were reversed by the Court of Appeals:
In the case at bar the Union's conduct comes squarely within
§ 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This is a lawful and peaceful
strike which Congress said a federal court may not enjoin. The
Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills was concerned with a refusal
to arbitrate - conduct not protected by § 4 and at odds with
congressional policy. It did not involve a strike - the issue here.
The ultimate question in Lincoln Mills was whether or not Congress by § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act authorized the federal
courts to compel arbitration. The question here is whether or
ont Congress by that same provision intended to repeal the
Norris-LaGuardia Act pro tanto. This is not the question which
before the Supreme Court.6
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed primarily to prevent federal courts from abusing their injunctive powers to stop strikes 61. 47 Stat. 70, 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104(a), (e) (1952).
62. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm
Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940) ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Local
721 v. Central of Georgia Ry., 229 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1956).
63. An agreement to arbitrate grievances has been considered the quid
pro quo for an agreement not to strike. See text at note 25 .pra.
64. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 155 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.N.Y.
1957); Bull S.S. Co. v. National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n, 156 F.
Supp. 190 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
65. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Intl Union, 155 F. Supp. 739, 742
(E.D.N.Y. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
66. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957),

cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).

67. See 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1952) ; Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana FRR. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40
(1957).
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the traditional labor injunction.67 Although the act applies to injunctions against the union or the employer, its provisions are much
more specific in protecting the union, "s and the circuit court felt
bound by the clear meaning and purpose of § 4 which precludes
injunctions against peaceful picketing. The anomalous result of
the decision is that although the system of autonomous self-government is subjected to the intervention of the courts, that intervention
fails to promote industrial peace; yet, promoting industrial peace is
the very purpose for allowing courts to intervene at all. Of course,
both parties generally are willing to submit grievances to arbitration
in accord with their contract and to abide by the arbitrator's final
award. In these cases the courts are not needed. But, when the
parties do not so agree, the whole purpose of arbitration becomes
frustrated under the Bull Steamship rule, a result contrary to the
present policy of Congress as interpreted in Lincoln Mills.6 9
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bull Steamship.70 Thus,
as the law now stands, the Lincoln Mills doctrine permits a mandatory injunction compelling arbitration under the contract provision,
but it does not permit a prohibitory injunction against acts protected by Norris-LaGuardia.7 1 This position has been supported by
reasoning that the employer has an adequate remedy at law for
damages resulting from the strike, and therefore that equitable
relief is unnecessary.7 2 It is argued that the threat of a suit for
damages against the union treasury would generally be a sufficient
deterrent to a union which is contemplating a strike in violation of
a no-strike clause. A second reason supporting Bull Steamship is
that allowing strike injunctions to enforce the arbitration agreements would "fly in the face of Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. ' 73 Section 4 clearly prohibits a permanent injunction against
peaceful striking. Allowing an injunction to enforce an arbitration
68. See, e.g., 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1952).

69. But see Feinsinger, Enforcement of LaborAgreements-A New Era
in Collective Bargaining, 43 Va. L. Rev. 1261, 1273-74 (1957), where the
author suggests that unions may refuse to accept arbitration provisions in
their contracts if strike injunctions to enforce those provisions were available.
70. 355 U.S. 932 (1958). Denial of certiorari is, of course, not equivalent
to approval of the circuit ruling. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter respecting the
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
71. This is the position taken by the circuit court in the General Electric case. 233 F.2d at 93. Professor Cox contends that this grants only
"partial, ineffective relief unless the union yielded to moral pressure." Cox,
Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 591, 603

(1954).

72. See Local 205, United Electrical Workers v. General Electric Co.,
233 F.2d 85, 93 (lst Cir. 1956).
73. See Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 Harv.
L. Rev. 591, 603-04 (1954).
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clause would violate the union's traditional privilege to exercise
unilateral coercive conduct while bargaining with an employer.
More important, though, § 4 also prohibits temporary strike injunctions, which are the primary tools for strike-breaking. If the
Norris-LaGuardia provisions were inapplicable to an arbitration
case, an employer could resort to the unfair tactics of procuring a
temporary strike injunction merely by alleging that the particular
dispute is arbitrable within the contract terms. Although the injunction would be lifted if the dispute were later found not within
the arbitration provision, the purpose of the strike might by that
time have been defeated. Since most collective bargaining agreements now include some form of arbitration provision, allowing
federal courts to enjoin strikes which allegedly violate that provision
could nearly nullify the restrictions imposed on those courts by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The first argument supporting the Bull Steamship result, that
an employer has an adequate remedy in damages, misses the crucial
objection that industrial peace is disrupted. Damages do not compensate the public for the adverse impact of the strike, even though
the public interest in preventing industrial strife is apparently the
justification for court intervention in arbitration cases. 74 Although
the threat of a damage suit by an employer may deter a strike in
many cases, the argument does not account for those cases in which
the union does in fact strike.
The second argument in support of the Bull Steamship result,
that allowing strike injunctions to enforce arbitration agreements
would defeat the purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, also
conflicts with the policy of promoting industrial peace. The union's
interest in preventing permanent injunctions against striking over
arbitrable disputes must be weighed against the public interest in
enforcing collective bargaining contract obligations in order to prevent disruption of industry. When the union has agreed to settle
a dispute by arbitration, there seems to be no reason to protect
its privilege to strike over that dispute. One authority has further
reasoned that:
74. Congress' concern with the public interest in promoting industrial

peace is apparent in the legislative history of § 301. The Senate Committee's
Report stated:
If unions can break agreements with relative impunity then such agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial relations....

Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements and to pro-

mote industrialpeace through faithful performance by the parties, collective agreements affecting interstate commerce should be enforceable
in the Federal courts. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
(Emphasis added.)
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[E]ven if [lifting the Norris-LaGuardia ban on strike injunctions in arbitration cases] be viewed as a return to the era of
labor injunctions, this anathema of a generation past must be
viewed from a present day perspective. Labor organization has
now reached a stage of development where it should be as
bound by its contractual obligations as is any ordinary individual. If in return for collective benefits the union agrees not
to strike, it should be held to both the benefits and the burdens
of the contract. If the parties agree to arbitrate, the agreement
should be enforceable-and effectively-regardless upon whom
the onus may fall.... The zealous protection and humanitarian
immunization formerly accorded to organized labor were necessary and desirable in a period when labor-management equality
was not a reality but an ever sought after goal. If the goal has
been achieved and a contract has been freely and voluntarily
made, the protection and immunization become anachronismsunsuitable for current conditions and indeed hindrances to the
development of responsible unionism. 5
The most persuasive support for the Bull Steamship rule is in
the danger that summarily granted temporary injunctions could
be used to defeat strikes over disputes which the union has not
agreed to arbitrate under the terms of the contract. Obviously,
granting a temporary strike injunction on the groundless contention that the particular dispute is arbitrable would be inexcusable.
Section 301 binds the union only to its contract obligations, and
that section cannot justify enjoining a strike over a clearly nonarbitrable dispute. However, courts cannot effectively enforce the
contract arbitration obligations without the power to issue temporary injunctions. If a union is always privileged to strike until
the particular dispute has been held arbitrable, the goal of peaceful
relations under the contract is unattainable. It seems necessary to
allow temporary injunctions at least when there are reasonable
grounds for deciding that the dispute is within the scope of the
76
arbitration provision.
75. Mendelsohn, Enforceability or Arbitration Agreements Under TaftHartley Section 301, 66 Yale L.J. 167, 183 (1956).
76. The question arises whether the district courts should pass on the
merits of a request for arbitration before ordering submission to arbitration
or whether the courts should order submission and allow the arbitrator to
decide whether the request raises an arbitrable dispute. In Local 149,
American Federation of Technical Engineers v. General Electric Co., 250
F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957), it was held that before an order compelling arbitration of a particular dispute can be issued, the court must first decide the
question of arbitrability. The court reasoned that since the arbitrator has
only the limited jurisdiction to decide questions the arbitration provision
authorizes him to decide, the question of arbitrability is for the arbitrator only
if the parties' contract so provides. Many authorities are of the contrary
view that the arbitrator and not a court should always decide the question of
arbitrability. See 250 F.2d at 926.
An arbitrator could almost invariably reach a more speedy decision
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From the discussion above it is clear that the policy of NorrisLaGuardia as interpreted in Bull Steamship conflicts with the
policy of § 301 as interpreted in Lincoln Mills, and that resolution
of the conflict rests in a value judgment on the interests involved.
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chsicago River & Indiana
R.R.,7 7 a case decided just two months before Lincoln Mills, the
Supreme Court was faced with a similar conflict and decided in
favor of promoting industrial peace.
The Railway Labor Act Cases
In Chicago River the Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was inapplicable to a permanent strike injunction in a railway
labor case involving a "minor dispute" which was pending before
the National Railroad Adjustment Board. A "minor dispute" under the Railway Labor Act"8 is a grievance arising under the
terms of an existing collective bargaining contract, as compared
with a "major dispute" which results from a disagreement in bargaining for the terms of a new contract.79 The act provides that
"minor disputes" may be referred by either party to the Adjustment Board for arbitration, and that the Board's award is final and
binding upon both parties to the dispute ;8o in effect, it imposes on
the parties an agreement to arbitrate all grievances arising during
the course of the contract. The Railway Labor Act, like TaftHartley § 301, does not expressly exempt cases enforcing its provisions from the provisions of Norris-LaGuardia.
The Court alluded to "fundamental premises and principles" of
the Railway Act which differed from those of Taft-Hartley, and it
said one of these differences underlay the controversy in the
Chicago River case. 8' The Court never disclosed the difference to
than could a court on the question of arbitrability. Normally, more time is

neded to get a case before a court than to get a hearing before an arbitrator.
Then too, the arbitrator will often have the benefit of experience from prior
hearings under the particular arbitration provision. If the arbitrator were to
decide arbitrability, the argument that there is a danger of strike-breaking
temporary injunctions would become less persuasive. A union probably
would not be seriously hurt if its strike were delayed only for a few weeks
until the arbitrator ruled that the dispute was not arbitrable. The public
interest in enforcing labor contracts to prevent disruption of industry would
in these circumstances seem to outweigh the danger of temporary injunctions against strikes over non-arbitrable disputes.
77. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
78. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. . 151 (1952).
79. Compare48 Stat. 1188 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. . 152 (Sixth)
(1952), with 48 Stat. 1188 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. , 152 (Seventh)
(1952). See Elgin, .oliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
80. 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (First) (i), (in)
(1952).
81. 353 U.S. at 31 n. 2.
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which it was referring. It appears that there are only two principal
differences relevant to a strike injunction enforcing arbitration
agreements. First, while arbitration under the Railway Act is
mandatory in all minor disputes, 2 arbitration under § 301, in light
of Lincoln Mills, is mandatory only in those cases in which the
dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration provision of the
contract. Although this difference might arguably indicate more
congressional concern with preventing interruptions in transportation industries than in other industries, it does not negative congressional concern with industrial peace in other industries. The
history of § 301 leaves no doubt that Congress intended to minimize industrial strife in all industries. But there is a greater public
interest in uninterrupted transportation than in promoting industrial peace in other industries; at least a strike in a transportation
industry has a more immediate and direct crippling affect on the
public. Perhaps this difference in itself is a sufficient ground for
treating Railway Act cases differently from § 301 cases, but it would
lead to the conclusion that Norris-LaGuardia does not apply to any
case seeking a strike injunction to enforce arbitration of a dispute
in a transportation industry, whether the action arises under the
Railway Act or under § 301. It seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court intended to read into the Norris-LaGuardia Act a blanket
exemption of the transportation industry's collective bargaining
agreements.
The second principal difference is that the Railway Act establishes a carefully defined procedure for arbitration by the Adjustment Board, 83 while § 301 provides no specific procedure for the
private arbitration. Perhaps this difference would justify the opposite results. s4 However, this distinction is not mentioned in Chicago
River, Lincoln Mills or Bull Steamship. Furthermore, the fact that
§ 301 sets out no detailed procedure for arbitration does not mean
that the procedure cannot be governed by other statutes, 5 or by
provisions of the contract.8 6
82. See 48 Stat 1191 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (First) (i),
(m) (1952).
83. See 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1952).
84. See Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in
Collective Bargaining,43 Va. L. Rev. 1261, 1273-74 (1957).

85. Some sections of the United States Arbitration Act, 61 Stat. 669

(1947), 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), provide procedures for the arbitration hearing.

See the discussion of that act in the Summary and Conclusion section infra.
The Uniform Arbitration Act also provides some procedures for the arbitration hearing. See Pirsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the

Lincoln Mills Case, 42, Minn. L. Rev. 333 (1958).

86. The collective bargaining contract may provide, for example, that
arbitration will be conducted in accordance with the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.
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In Chicago River the Court distinguished an earlier case 87
which held that Norris-LaGuardia precluded an injunction in a
"major dispute" under the Railway Labor Act:
In such a case, of course, the Railway Labor Act does not provide a process for a final decision like that of the Adjustment
Board in a "minor dispute" case. 88
The act's provision for enforceable arbitration, which had the approval of the national railway labor organizations, 89 established a
fair method for settling disputes without a strike. The Court said
that controversies in which the opposing economic forces are channeled into this special process intended to compromise them "are
not the same as those [controversies] in which the injunction
strips labor of its primary weapon without substituting any reasonable alternative."0 This reasoning logically suggests that the strike
injunction should have been granted in the Bull Steamship case,
because the parties in that case also had an enforceable agreement
to arbitrate their disputes. The Court's apparent approval of the
opposite conclusion seems to be inconsistent with its Chicago River
reasoning, leaving other courts unsure of the Supreme Court's position regarding the development of the Lincoln Mills doctrine.
These courts will probably find it difficult -to fashion substantive
law under Lincoln Mills when they are uncertain of the fundamental policy of that law.
The McCarroll Case
McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters,"1 a recent California case, presented the question whether a
state court is precluded from enjoining a strike while enforcing
87. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. RR., 321
U.S. 50 (1944).
88. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana
R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 42 n. 24 (1957). Apparently the Court intended to establish a policy distinction between granting injunctions in minor dispute cases
and doing so in major dispute cases because the earlier case was easily distinguishable on other grounds. The earlier case was a request for an injunction against acts of violence and not against peaceul picketing. The holding
of the case was not based on § 4 but rather on § 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act; § 8 provides that the complainant cannot be granted an injunction inless he has made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute. The complainant
in the earlier case had failed to voluntarily submit to mediation by the Mediation Board. Presumably § 8 could be the basis for denying an injunction even
in a minor dispute case. The Court went out of its way to establish a distinction on facts not even alluded to in the earlier case.
89. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana

R.R., 353 U.S. 30,37 (1957).

90. Id. at 41. (Emphasis added.)

91. 315 P2d 322 (Cal. 1957), cert denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
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§ 301 because that remedy is not available in a federal court,0 2 even
though the state law would permit a strike injunction. The state
court granted the injunction, reasoning that while the state must
apply federal law in these cases, it is free to furnish a state remedy
because the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not restrict the injunctive
powers of state courts, and neither the provisions nor the purposes
of § 301 require that a strike injunction must be denied. 3 If the
McCarroll view is generally accepted, employers may be able to
avoid the Bull Steamship rule by seeking enforcement of their arbitration agreements in the appropriate state court, provided that the
state has no anti-injunction statute. The union probably could not
prevent a strike injunction by removing the case to a federal court
because removal 4 normally will be denied when relief sought by
the plaintiff would be available only in the state court. 3 However,
many states do have "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts" interpreted
similar to the federal act, 96 and in these states both state and
federal courts will be powerless to stop the union's strike.
92. The court's assumption that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes a
federal court from enjoining a strike while enforcing a collective bargaining
contract arbitration clause under § 301 is correct according to the Bull
Steamship case. See text at note 66 supra.
93. The California court held that federal and not state law must be
applied under § 301 because "otherwise the scope of the litigants' rights will
depend on the accident of the forum in which the action is brought." McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 315 P.2d
322, 330 (Cal. 1957). Yet, the result of its own decision makes the extent
to which an arbitration clause can be enforced depend on the "accident" of
the forum chosen. The decision might be justified by the conceptual distinction between rights and remedies, the latter traditionally being a matter of the
law of the forum even when the court is enforcing foreign law.
The McCarroll case is an example of the many difficult state court problems raised under Lincoln Mills. Other courts will likely be called upon to
answer similar questions: (1) whether Norris-LaGuardia is a national
labor act, the policy of which is binding on state courts thereby precluding
strike injunctions; (2) whether the substantive law applicable in a state
court is state or federal law; (3) whether state courts enforcing § 301 rights
must apply federal procedural rules. A discussion and resolution of these
and other related problems is beyond the scope of this Note. See Note, 9
Hastings L.J. 203 (1958).
94. Under 62 Stat 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1952), removal to a
federal court is authorized of "any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction."
95. See, e.g., Lock Joint Pipe Co. v. Anderson, 127 F. Supp. 692 (W.D.
Mo. 1955) ; Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 144 F. Supp.
334 (S.D. Cal. 1953) ; Castle & Cook Terminals v. Local 137, International
Longshoremen's Union, 110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953).
96. See Lab. Rel. Rep. (L.R.X. 548-49) (1957). However, state courts
typically are more willing to grant injunctions than are federal courts, even
though the applicable state statute is closely patterned after the NorrisLaGuardia Act. Some state statutes expressly except cases involving a breach
of a labor contract. For example, the Pennsylvania Anti-Injunction Act, Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 206d (Purdon 1952), provides that the act does not
apply to a labor dispute "which is in disregard, breach, or violation of, or
which tends to procure the disregard, breach, or violation of, a valid subsisting labor agreement"
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CONCLUSION

A literal reading of Taft-Hartley § 301 discloses only a grant
of federal jurisdiction over cases involving breach of a labor contract. The Supreme Court's sweeping interpretation in Lincoln
Mills read into § 301 a grant of federal substantive rights, and
courts were given the task of defining as well as enforcing these
rights. The problems discussed in this Note were raised by the
Lincoln Mills decision and by subsequent decisions of other courts
attempting to apply the Lincoln Mills ruling to suits for enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement arbitration clause. The
solutions to these problems turn on basic federal policy toward
enforcement of labor arbitration agreements. According to the
Supreme Court, federal policy is in favor of enforcing arbitration
clauses to promote industrial peace during the time the contract
is in force. Assuming this conclusion is correct, it is appropriate
to suggest the ways this policy should be applied to alleviate the
problems raised.
First, federal courts should enforce an arbitration clause whether
or not the grievance sought to be arbitrated involves "uniquely
personal" rights of the employees. Even if the Westinghouse case
is still good law, the reasoning underlying its limitations on § 301
jurisdiction is inapplicable to arbitration cases where the union
clearly sues to enforce a provision of the collective bargaining agreement rather than the individual hiring contract. Furthermore, exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB should not be extended to oust
courts of § 301 arbitration cases; the courts are better suited than
the Board to the tasks of contract interpretation and enforcement,
the two primary functions performed in an arbitration case.
Second, the procedural provisions of the United States Arbitration Act should govern suits for enforcement of labor arbitration agreements. The Arbitration Act prescribes procedures for
ordering a stay of separate court proceedings when there is an
arbitrable grievance in dispute, for appointing arbitrators, for compelling witnesses to appear at the arbitration hearing, for confirming the arbitrator's award, for vacating, modifying or correcting
a faulty award within designated limits, and for ordering specific
enforcement of the award.97 These provisions outline standard procedures which are well calculated to encourage arbitration as a
private method for settling grievances, and they resolve many of
the procedural problems likely to face courts enforcing arbitration
clauses. Congress could require courts to apply the procedures out97. 61 Stat. 669, 670-73 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13 (1952).
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lined in the Arbitration Act by incorporating identical provisions
into § 301, or by making the Arbitration Act applicable to collective bargaining agreements; either method would accomplish the
desired result. A bill recently introduced before the House of
Representatives adopts the latter method by proposing appropriate
98
amendments to the Arbitration Act.
Third, suits for enforcement of labor arbitration agreements
should be exempted from the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Labor injunctions-even strike injunctions-which are granted to enforce an arbitration clause are in complete harmony with
the policy of § 301, at least as it is now interpreted, that arbitration
clauses should be completely binding upon both employer and
union. Courts cannot effectively promote peaceful industrial relations under the contract unless they have power to compel full
reliance on arbitration where that method of handling grievance disputes presents a "reasonable alternative" for reaching a fair settlement.
These three steps would lay the skeleton foundation on which
courts could build a sound and uniform law of labor arbitration.
98. H.R. 10308, proposed by Congressman Ludwig Teller (D., N.Y.),
104 Cong. Rec. 10601 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1958). See remarks of the author,
104 Cong. Rec. 1054 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1958). The full text of the proposed amendment is printed at 41 L.R.R.M. 270 (1958).
The bill does not expressly recognize one technical difficulty presented
by language of the Arbitration Act. Section 4 of the act, as amended in 1954,
provides that a party may petition any "United States district court which
...would have jurisdiction under Title 28 . . . of a suit arising out of the
controversy .. " 61 Stat. 669 (1947), as amended, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (Supp. IV,
1957). (Emphasis added.) For the purpose of the 1954 amendment, see 3
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3998 (1954). The relevant sections of Title 28
provide that a federal district court will have jurisdiction where the controversy arises under federal laws and "exceeds the sum or value of $3,000,"
62 Stat. 930, (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952), or where there is diversity of
citizenship and the amount in controversy "exceeds ... $3,000." 62 Stat 930
(1948), 28 U.S.C. § 133 2 a(1) (1952). (Emphasis added.) The Arbitration Act
presently makes no provision for federal jurisdiction of cases involving less
than $3,000, although Taft-Hartley § 301 expressly waives the jurisdictional
amount requirement. There seems to be no reason for retaining this requirement which would obviously exclude many typical arbitration cases involving
individual grievances where the amount in controversy is less than $3,000.
Removal of this technical defect will help avoid confusion in applying the
Arbitration Act to labor controversies.

